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Automation in Moderation
Hannah Bloch-Wehba†

What is an AutoModerator?
An AutoModerator is a bot designed to automate various moderation tasks
that require little or no human judgement. It can watch the new/spam/comments/report queues of any subreddit it moderates and take actions on submissions and comments based on defined conditions. This includes
approving or removing them . . . . It is effectively fairly similar to reddit’s
built-in spam-filter, but [also] allows for conditions to be defined specifically
instead of just giving vague hints by removing/approving. Its decisions can
† Assistant Professor of Law, Drexel University Thomas R. Kline School of Law;
Affiliated Fellow, Yale Law School Information Society Project. I am very grateful to
RonNell Andersen Jones, Rebecca Crootof, James Grimmelmann, Anil Kalhan, Jonathan
Marks, Christopher Reed, Daniel Susser, and Ari Ezra Waldman for their helpful
comments and feedback on this project. Portions of this Article were presented at the
Cornell International Law Journal’s Symposium, the Penn State Law School Works-inProgress Workshop, and Yale Law School’s Information Society Project. My thanks to
the student organizers of the symposium and the editors of the Cornell International Law
Journal. This Article reflects developments through December 2019, when it was
finalized for publication. All errors are my own.
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always be overridden by human mod[erators], exactly like an existing filter.1

Introduction
In March 2019, a shooter posted a white nationalist manifesto on
“8chan,” an online message board, and then livestreamed on Facebook as
he murdered fifty-one people at two mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand.2 In the aftermath of the shooting, millions of users viewed the video
on YouTube and Facebook even as the sites struggled to keep the video
offline.3 In July 2019, Brandon Clark murdered Bianca Devins and posted
grisly pictures of her corpse on the social media platforms Instagram and
Discord before attempting suicide and being arrested.4 The photos, tagged
with the hashtag #RIPBianca, quickly spread throughout social media platforms even as users flagged them and called the police in real time.5 On
Yom Kippur of October 2019, another shooter live-streamed on Twitch, a
gaming platform, as he murdered two people in a synagogue in Halle,
Germany.6
In the wake of these incidents, lawmakers around the world are closely
scrutinizing “content moderation”— the set of practices that online platforms use to screen, rank, filter, and block user-generated content. One
particularly notable regulatory strategy encourages platforms to use technology to prevent the dissemination of unlawful online content before it is
1. What is AutoModerator?, REDDIT (2012), http://www.reddit.com/r/AutoModerator/comments/q11pu/what_is_automoderator [https://perma.cc/2XRR-5525].
2. See Kevin Roose, A Mass Murder of, and for, the Internet, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
15, 2019) https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/15/technology/facebook-youtube-christ
church-shooting.html [https://perma.cc/XP8P-MCZR]. See also Richard Pérez-Peña, Two
New Zealand Mosques, a Hate-Filled Massacre Designed for Its Time, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15,
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/15/world/australia/new-zealand-mosqueshooting.html [https://perma.cc/B7AK-SC3L].
3. Elizabeth Dwoskin & Craig Timberg, Inside YouTube’s Struggles to Shut Down
Video of the New Zealand Shooting— and the Humans Who Outsmarted Its Systems, WASH.
POST (Mar. 18, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/
03/18/inside-youtubes-struggles-shut-down-video-new-zealand-shooting-humans-whooutsmarted-its-systems/ [https://perma.cc/7HT9-7MNV]; Kate Klonick, Inside the Team
at Facebook That Dealt with the Christchurch Shooting, NEW YORKER (Apr. 25, 2019),
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/inside-the-team-at-facebook-that-dealtwith-the-christchurch-shooting [https://perma.cc/UV28-2RKF] [hereinafter Inside the
Team at Facebook That Dealt with the Christchurch Shooting]; Cade Metz & Adam Satariano, Facebook Restricts Live Streaming After New Zealand Shooting, N.Y. TIMES (May 14,
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/14/technology/facebook-live-violent-content.html [https://perma.cc/T2MH-5BPL]; Charlie Warzel, The New Zealand Massacre
Was Made to Go Viral, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/
15/opinion/new-zealand-shooting.html [https://perma.cc/2YYT-M825].
4. Michael Gold, #RIPBianca: How a Teenager’s Brutal Murder Ended Up on
Instagram, N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/15/nyregion/bianca-devins-death.html [https://perma.cc/44GK-7XLG].
5. Id.; Taylor Romine, Brandon Clark, Accused of Killing Internet Personality Bianca
Devins, Pleads Not Guilty, CNN (July 29, 2019, 4:38 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/
07/29/us/bianca-devins-murder-new-york/index.html [https://perma.cc/88E7-CJCQ].
6. Melissa Eddy et al., Assailant Live-Streamed Attempt Attack on German Synagogue,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/09/world/europe/ger
many-shooting-halle-synagogue.html [https://perma.cc/Q3R5-QEZE].
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ever seen or distributed.7 This Article outlines recent efforts to compel or
encourage platforms to engage in automated, ex ante monitoring, filtering,
and blocking of online content across a variety of contexts— defamation,
copyright infringement, and terrorist speech. Proponents of these initiatives suggest that ex ante screening requirements will incentivize platforms
to promote healthier online discourse. Supporters have also suggested that
new efforts to regulate platforms’ “content moderation” practices limit Big
Tech’s power by requiring platforms to bear an appropriate amount of
responsibility.8
But this new breed of regulation comes with unappreciated costs for
civil liberties and unexpected boons for platform power.9 The new automation techniques exacerbate existing risks to free speech and user privacy, and create new sources of information that can be exploited for
surveillance, raising concerns about free association, religious freedoms,
and racial profiling. Moreover, the automation process worsens transparency and accountability deficits. Far from curtailing private power, the
new regulations expand platform authority to include policing online
speech, with little oversight and few countervailing checks. This embrace
of automation in moderation displays unwarranted optimism about technology’s ability to solve what is fundamentally a social and political
problem.
Technology platforms’ role as “central players” in governing online
speech and surveillance has been the subject of rich and growing scholarly
literature.10 In comparison, the role of automation in this context has
7. But automated systems currently in place do not always work and platforms
often depend on users and third parties to report harmful content. These calls are not
limited to ordinary posts by individual users. In spring 2019, Facebook pulled Donald
Trump’s campaign ads after their automated system failed to detect that the ads violated
the platform’s guidelines by explicitly targeting voters based on gender. Owen Daugherty, Facebook Pulls Trump Campaign Ad Violating Platform’s Policy, HILL (Aug. 20, 2019,
2:12 PM), https://thehill.com/policy/technology/458116-facebook-pulls-trump-cam
paign-ad-violating-platforms-policy [https://perma.cc/L6HR-J2ER]; Judd Legum,
Facebook Admits Trump Campaign Is Violating Its Rules, Takes Down Numerous Ads
Targeting Women, POPULAR INFO. (Aug. 19, 2019), https://popular.info/p/facebookadmits-trump-campaign-is [https://perma.cc/HC2G-85LR].
8. See, e.g., Kevin Madigan, Will the EU Finally Hold Internet Giants Accountable?,
CPIP (July 3, 2018), https://cpip.gmu.edu/2018/07/03/will-the-eu-finally-hold-internetgiants-accountable/ [https://perma.cc/SJ9Y-LTXF] (describing online platforms as “the
most powerful and wealthy entities in the world”); Europe Takes an Important Step Toward
Platform Accountability with Directive on Copyright, AAP (Sept. 13, 2018), https://newsroom.publishers.org/europe-takes-an-important-step-toward-platform-accountabilitywith-directive-on-copyright/ [https://perma.cc/EW35-TNPF]. See also Press Release,
U.S. Senator Josh Hawley, Senator Hawley Introduces Legislation to Amend Section 230
Immunity for Big Tech Companies (June 19, 2019) (available at https://www.hawley.
senate.gov/senator-hawley-introduces-legislation-amend-section-230-immunity-big-techcompanies [https://perma.cc/FMM5-9PSJ]).
9. This analysis is necessarily preliminary, both because the regulatory landscape
has shifted dramatically in the last year, and because technological change is underway.
See infra Part II (discussing recent regulatory developments).
10. See generally, e.g., JULIE E. COHEN, BETWEEN TRUTH AND POWER: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF INFORMATIONAL CAPITALISM (Oxford Univ. Press 2019); Jack Balkin, Essay,
Free Speech Is a Triangle, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2011 (2018) [hereinafter Free Speech Is a
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received scant scholarly attention. This article aims to fill that gap by
exploring the utility of automation,11 and how its use in law enforcement
may lead to cooptation by powerful actors.12 Automation affords a new
and attractive menu of options for private stakeholders, law enforcement,
and intelligence agencies.13 Automation in content moderation is part of a
much broader push for private industry to develop swifter, more accurate,
and more effective technologies to aid law enforcement.
Private companies, not state actors, largely control the infrastructure
of free speech today.14 The largely hands-off approach to regulating online
intermediaries has also allowed them to develop extraordinary expertise
regarding controlling the delivery of online content— harvesting, compiling,
and profiting off of vast amounts of user data in the process. Today, the
Triangle]; Anupam Chander, Facebookistan, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1807 (2012); Danielle Keats
Citron, Extremist Speech, Compelled Conformity, and Censorship Creep, 93 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1035 (2018) [hereinafter Extremist Speech]; Jennifer Daskal, Speech Across Borders,
105 VA. L. REV. 1605 (2019); Kristen E. Eichensehr, Digital Switzerlands, 167 U. PA. L.
REV. 665 (2019); Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing Online Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598 (2018); Molly K. Land, Against Privatized
Censorship: Proposals for Responsible Delegation, 60 VA. J. INT’L L. (forthcoming July
2020); Kyle Langvardt, Regulating Online Content Moderation, 106 GEO. L.J. 1353 (2018);
Frank Pasquale, Beyond Innovation and Competition: The Need for Qualified Transparency
in Internet Intermediaries, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 105 (2010); Alan Z. Rozenshtein, Surveillance Intermediaries, 70 STAN. L. REV. 99 (2018). See also TARLETON GILLESPIE, CUSTODIANS OF THE INTERNET: PLATFORMS, CONTENT MODERATION, AND THE HIDDEN DECISIONS THAT
SHAPE SOCIAL MEDIA 177 (Yale Univ. Press 2018); SARAH T. ROBERTS, BEHIND THE SCREEN:
CONTENT MODERATION IN THE SHADOWS OF SOCIAL MEDIA 33 (Yale Univ. Press 2019).
11. Except for algorithmic copyright enforcement, which has been the subject of sustained examination, automation in moderation has largely escaped scrutiny. See generally Annemarie Bridy, Is Online Copyright Enforcement Scalable?, 13 VAND. J. ENT. &
TECH. L. 695 (2011) [hereinafter Is Online Copyright Enforcement Scalable?]; Lital
Helman & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Best Available Technology Standard, 111 COLUM. L.
REV. 1194 (2011); Maayan Perel & Niva Elkin-Koren, Accountability in Algorithmic Copyright Enforcement, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 473 (2016). Many scholars are considering the
automation of decision-making in other adjudicatory settings. See Danielle Keats Citron,
Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249, 1254 (2008) [hereinafter Technological Due Process]; Cary Coglianese & David Lehr, Regulating by Robot: Administrative
Decision Making in the Machine-Learning Era, 105 GEO. L.J. 1147, 1152 (2017); Cary
Coglianese & David Lehr, Transparency and Algorithmic Governance, 71 ADMIN. L. REV. 1,
1 (2019) [hereinafter Transparency and Algorithmic Governance]. See, e.g., Kiel BrennanMarquez & Stephen E. Henderson, Artificial Intelligence and Role-Reversible Judgment,
109 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137, 137 (2019); Rebecca Crootof, “Cyborg Justice” and
the Risk of Technological-Legal Lock-In, 119 COLUM. L. REV. F. 233, 233 (2019); Sandra G.
Mayson, Bias in, Bias Out, 128 YALE L.J. 2218, 2218 (2019); Frank Pasquale, A Rule of
Persons, Not Machines: The Limits of Legal Automation, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 2
(2019); Eugene Volokh, Chief Justice Robots, 68 DUKE L.J. 1135, 1135 (2019).
12. See Jack M. Balkin, Old-School/New-School Speech Regulation, 127 HARV. L. REV.
2296, 2324– 29 (2014) [hereinafter Old-School/New-School Speech Regulation].
13. See SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM: THE FIGHT FOR A
HUMAN FUTURE AT THE NEW FRONTIER OF POWER (Pub. Affairs 1st ed. 2019).
14. The prevalence of private ownership has shifted the legal landscape from a dualist system in which states regulate speakers directly, to a pluralist model in which the
Internet infrastructure serves as a critical intermediary between states and speakers.
Free Speech Is a Triangle, supra note 10, at 2021. See also Klonick, supra note 10, at
1617.
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private sector’s capacity to structure, censor, and control the flow of information far outstrips that of the government.
This reality has given rise to a new regulatory approach. Under the
new breed of regulation— typified by initiatives like the European Union’s
Copyright Directive, Germany’s Network Enforcement Act of 2018, and
Australia’s Abhorrent Violent Material (AVM) statute— platforms must take
down unlawful content faster, sometimes within twenty-four hours.15 Yet,
the state does not directly require online platforms to adopt specific methods or techniques to achieve this goal, nor to directly control the outcomes
of content moderation decisions. Rather, this new approach imposes
demanding obligations on platforms while at the same time yielding to
them substantial discretion and enforcement authority, leaving it to the private sector to determine how to comply.16
This approach might seem like an appropriate middle ground between
command-and-control regulation on the one hand, and self-regulation on
the other. Indeed, what might variously be called co-regulation, collaborative governance, or multi-stakeholder governance is an increasingly popular framework for governing the technology sector in multiple contexts far
beyond content regulation.17
In the context of automated content regulation, however, this approach
has several major drawbacks. First, in the absence of clear obligations,
platforms will tend to over-censor and over-block. Both, state actors and
the private sector, have acknowledged that automated content moderation
is both over- and under-inclusive.18 Automation also creates new sources
of information that will be valuable to both, private and public sector
actors, and opens the door for further “relational” surveillance of users and
their broader networks.19
Second, this regulatory paradigm extends law enforcement’s influence
to the design, process, and substance of automated content moderation.
Politics already affect the design and the implementation of content moderation rules like the types of user-generated content that platforms opt to
control and the ways in which platforms police that content.20 Though pri15. See discussion infra Part II.
16. Id.
17. See Robert Gorwa et al., Algorithmic Content Moderation: Technical and Political
Challenges in the Automation of Platform Governance, BIG DATA & SOC’Y, Jan.– June 2020,
at 1, 1– 2 (describing a movement toward co-regulation and transnational standards);
Margot E. Kaminski, Binary Governance: Lessons from the GDPR’s Approach to Algorithmic
Accountability, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 1529, 1533 (describing how algorithmic accountability
requires both collaborative governance and an individual rights regime).
18. See Gorwa et al., supra note 17, at 7– 10.
19. Katherine J. Strandburg, Freedom of Association in a Networked World: First
Amendment Regulation of Relational Surveillance, 49 B.C. L. REV. 741, 751 (2008).
20. See, e.g., Joseph Cox & Jason Koebler, Why Won’t Twitter Treat White Supremacy
Like ISIS? Because It Would Mean Banning Some Republican Politicians Too, VICE (Apr. 25,
2019, 12:21 PM), https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/a3xgq5/why-wont-twit
ter-treat-white-supremacy-like-isis-because-it-would-mean-banning-some-republican-poli
ticians-too [https://perma.cc/J3AP-HXKH]; Casey Newton, Why Twitter Has Been Slow to
Ban White Nationalists, VERGE (Apr. 26, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.theverge.com/
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vately developed and implemented, these frameworks are neither apolitical
nor neutral.21 Rather, content moderation rules— and the technologies that
apply them— reflect corporate, social, and legal values.22 Platforms adapt
their content moderation rules and practices to conform to regulators’ preferences, both to comply and to avoid new regulations.
Perhaps the most significant danger of this approach is that, by designing new technologies of content moderation, platforms will create irresistible tools for law enforcement. Public-private cooperation is at the core of
ongoing efforts to fight cybercrime, and investigative methodologies are
increasingly rooted in proprietary technology.23 Although opponents of
“Big Tech” often describe automation-in-moderation requirements as a
method of checking platform power, many of these new initiatives are more
likely to entrench the power of online platforms by making them indispensable to government regulators. In their current form, regulations that
demand that platforms build and deploy proactive monitoring and filtering
mechanisms, risk aggrandizing the corporate power they ostensibly seek to
limit— they entrust the private sector to design its own compliance tools.24
Moreover, preserving the centralization and dominance of large technology
companies is likely to make surveillance cheaper and easier for law
enforcement.25
interface/2019/4/26/18516997/why-doesnt-twitter-ban-nazis-white-nationalism,
[https://perma.cc/E24Z-U4WQ].
21. See Old-School/New-School Speech Regulation, supra note 12, at 2298 (“Because
there are so many speakers, who are often anonymous, difficult to co-opt, or otherwise
beyond the government’s effective control, the state aims at Internet intermediaries and
other owners of digital infrastructure . . . .”); Hannah Bloch-Wehba, Global Platform
Governance: Private Power in the Shadow of the State, 72 SMU L. REV. 27, 27 (2019);
Technological Due Process, supra note 11, at 1037.
22. See FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION 61 (Harvard Univ. Press 2015) (“Despite their claims of
objectivity and neutrality, they are constantly making value-laden, controversial decisions.”). See also Ifeoma Ajunwa, The Paradox of Automation as Anti-Bias Intervention, 41
CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 3, 5 (forthcoming 2020); Klonick, supra note 10, at 1616 (citing
other scholars in support of the argument that Facebook’s legal culture is distinctively
imbued with American free speech thinking); Harry Surden, Values Embedded in Legal
Artificial Intelligence 1 (Univ. of Colo. Law Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 17-17,
2017) (“Technological systems can have values embedded in their design.”). See also
Bruno Latour, Technology Is Society Made Durable, 38 SOC. REV. 103, 130 (1990); Ari
Ezra Waldman, Power, Process, and Automated Decision-Making, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 4
(2019) (“[A]lgorithmic decision-making hides the fact that engineers and their corporate
employers are choosing winners and losers while steadfastly remaining agnostic about
the social, political, and economic consequences of their work.”).
23. ANDREW GUTHRIE FERGUSON, THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING: SURVEILLANCE, RACE,
AND THE FUTURE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT 129– 30 (N.Y. Univ. Press 2017).
24. See COHEN, supra note 10, at 122. (“As network intermediaries have resisted
efforts to write the logic of the exception into law, they have become masters at both
public relations and inside-the-Beltway political positioning. The result is a legal and
media landscape characterized by complex power struggles among the dominant interests. In those struggles, platforms do not simply play defense. Rather, they have worked
to position themselves as both essential partners and competing sovereigns in the quest
to instantiate states of exception algorithmically.”).
25. Tyler Cowen, Breaking Up Facebook Would Be a Big Mistake, SLATE (June 13, 2019,
7:30 AM), https://slate.com/technology/2019/06/facebook-big-tech-antitrust-breakup-
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This new breed of content regulation is worthy of its own analysis
because it illustrates the “embeddedness” of platforms in politics and the
ease with which states can influence ostensibly private regulation in order
to censor and surveil.26 Seen through this lens, the turn toward automation is neither a check on the power of technology companies nor a guarantee that they will act more effectively or more neutrally. Rather, the
increasing reliance on automation will heighten the risk that both, platforms and governments, will experience cooptation and capture.27
Over-reliance on the private development of new technologies of moderation is thus poor public policy on at least two levels. The turn toward
automation poses straightforward, significant risks to user speech and privacy, and fails to encompass meaningful checks against those risks. But in
a more political sense, the new regulations disguise themselves as accountability measures while providing the private sector with a source of power
and profit and entrenching frameworks through which they are likely to be
coopted.
The remainder of the discussion proceeds in four parts. Part I
describes how the framework of intermediary immunity permitted large
online platforms to experiment with automated moderation technologies,
and traces how this experimentation came to characterize modern online
platforms. Part II maps several recent legal developments that urge platforms to adopt automated and proactive filtering and monitoring techniques in sectors as far-flung as copyright enforcement, defamation, and
violent content. In Part III, the Article explores the normative consequences of these developments, considering how they might aggravate
existing tendencies toward censorship and surveillance, encode bias and
harmful stereotypes, and aggrandize corporate power. Part IV offers an
agenda for moderating the use of automation. Rigorous notice requirements, transparency rules, and independent oversight bodies— elements
mistake.html [https://perma.cc/L8GH-CFBL] (“We’re probably better off having major,
well-capitalized companies as guardians and gatekeepers of online channels, however
imperfect their records, as the relevant alternatives would probably be less able to fend
off abuse of their platforms and thus we would all fare worse.”). See also Jon Bateman,
The Antitrust Threat to National Security, WALL STREET J. (Oct. 22, 2019, 6:43 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-antitrust-threat-to-national-security-11571784197
[https://perma.cc/CK7S-8J3Q]; Cory Doctorow, Regulating Big Tech Makes Them
Stronger, so They Need Competition Instead, ECONOMIST (June 6, 2019), http://www.econ
omist.com/open-future/2019/06/06/regulating-big-tech-makes-them-stronger-so-theyneed-competition-instead [https://perma.cc/E6KY-6J9H].
26. Sarah T. Roberts, Digital Detritus: ‘Error’ and the Logic of Opacity in Social Media
Content Moderation, FIRST MONDAY (Mar. 2018), https://www.firstmonday.org/ojs/
index.php/fm/article/view/8283 [https://perma.cc/79XP-2EQC] (describing “the platforms’ own ‘embeddedness’ with the U.S. political establishment, and their own relationship to policy, foreign and domestic.”); Old-School/New-School Speech Regulation, supra
note 12, at 2325 (“[T]he government offers a combination of carrots and sticks, the
most important being legal immunity for assisting the government in identifying or
shutting down Internet sites and speakers that the government disfavors or seeks to
regulate.”).
27. Old-School/New-School Speech Regulation, supra note 12, at 2325– 26.
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notably lacking from the current initiatives— might promote accountability
for both, platforms and state actors.
I.

The Origins of Automation in Moderation

As James Grimmelmann defines it, moderation is “the governance
mechanisms that structure participation in a community to facilitate cooperation and prevent abuse.”28 By “content moderation,” I mean a platform’s internal decision-making on whether user-generated content
violates its rules, and if so, what the penalty might be.29 By enforcing what
Sarah Roberts calls the “rules of engagement in online social spaces,” content moderators attempt to delineate between acceptable and unacceptable
conduct as the platform defines it.30
These functions are inextricably linked to the formation and governance of online communities, but moderation also mitigates the risk that
unwanted content might alienate users and reduce platform profits.
Increasingly, moderation rules also address the risk that political actors
might regulate platforms in ways that would diminish the power of said
platforms.31 “Moderation,” thus, has two functions: to constitute rules and
procedures for a community, and to limit the “intensity or extremeness” of
its substance.32 By defining the boundaries of participation in a community and imposing sanctions on those who violate the conditions of that
membership, moderation rules are at the core of online communities’ ability to regulate themselves and shape the conditions for free expression.33
This Part begins by explaining how and why intermediary liability
laws in the United States (U.S.) and in Europe have historically granted
broad deference to platforms’ rules and mechanisms for governing user
speech. As a result of this deference, platforms were able to develop rules
and technologies for blocking, filtering, and monitoring user speech on a
voluntary basis.
A.

Immunity, Safe Harbor & Private Governance

Because both the U.S. and Europe have observed protections against
intermediary liability that formally deferred to self-regulation by online
actors, the private governance of online speech is of particular impor28. James Grimmelmann, The Virtues of Moderation, 17 YALE J.L. & TECH. 42, 47
(2015) [hereinafter The Virtues of Moderation] (emphasis omitted).
29. ROBERTS, supra note 10, at 1.
30. Id. at 33– 35.
31. See, e.g., James Grimmelmann, The Platform Is the Message, 2 GEO. L. TECH. REV.
217, 217 (2018) [hereinafter The Platform Is the Message]; Klonick, supra note 10, at
1667– 68. See also JULIAN DIBBELL, MY TINY LIFE: CRIME AND PASSION IN A VIRTUAL WORLD
20 (Henry Holt & Co. 1st ed. 1998) (considering the “death penalty”).
32. Moderate, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
moderation [https://perma.cc/L9RF-XZWS] (last visited June 23, 2020) (“1: to lessen
the intensity or extremeness of; 2: to preside over or act as chairman of . . . .”).
33. The Virtues of Moderation, supra note 28, at 48– 50; The Platform Is the Message,
supra note 31, at 224.
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tance.34 Intermediary protections found their strongest expression in Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA), which states:
“No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as
the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.”35 In the CDA’s “Good Samaritan” provision, Congress also enacted protections for providers who took action “in good faith”
to restrict “obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing
or otherwise objectionable” content.36 Under Section 230, information
service providers are immune from liability both for hosting content that
they know to be unlawful, and for removing content that they know to be
constitutionally protected.37
Few other intermediary protections contain language quite as broad as
Section 230. Compared with Section 230’s broad immunity, “safe harbors”
are a more common— and perhaps more justified— statutory approach,
offering a conditional defense against liability.38 Under Section 512 of the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, hosting providers are generally
not liable for instances of copyright infringement by users so long as they
do not know of the infringing material or activity.39 In the European
Union (EU), the E-Commerce Directive similarly shields service providers
from liability for hosting users’ illegal content so long as the providers do
not have knowledge, authority, or control over the content.40 Under both
of these “safe harbor” provisions, online service providers are required to
implement “notice-and-takedown” procedures to “expeditiously remove or
disable access to” content alleged to be illegal.41
The decision to insulate platforms from liability for hosting user-generated speech reflects several political inclinations. First, it communicates
34. See Klonick, supra note 10, at 1602.
35. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2012).
36. Id. § 230(c)(2).
37. See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 333 (4th Cir. 1997); Hassell v. Bird,
420 P.3d 776, 793 (Cal. 2018) (holding that Section 230 immunity shielded Yelp from a
court order directing it to take down defamatory consumer reviews); Danielle Keats Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Internet Will Not Break: Denying Bad Samaritans § 230
Immunity, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 401, 408 (2017) (“Platforms have been protected from
liability even though they republished content knowing it might violate the law,
encouraged users to post illegal content, changed their design and policies for the purpose of enabling illegal activity, or sold dangerous products.”). The breadth of Section
230’s protections is not unlimited, however. Service providers have no immunity for
violations of intellectual property law, federal criminal law, sex trafficking law, or the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 47 U.S.C. § 230(e) (2012).
38. James Grimmelmann, Speech Engines, 98 MINN. L. REV. 868, 946 n.371 (2014)
(arguing that the safe harbor of Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of
1998 is “a better model” for search engine liability than Section 230 of the CDA under
certain circumstances).
39. 17 U.S.C. § 512(d)(1) (1998).
40. Council Directive 2000/31, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8
June 2000 on Certain Legal Aspects of Information Society Services, in Particular Electronic Commerce, in the Internal Market (Directive on Electronic Commerce), art. 14,
2000 O.J. (L 178) 1, 13 [hereinafter E-Commerce Directive 2000/31].
41. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1). See also E-Commerce Directive 2000/31, supra note 40, at
art. 14 (containing nearly identical language).
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a set of normative assumptions about the valuable role of private ordering
in governing online speech.42 Second, it relies upon a logic of stimulating
innovation in order to expand the areas within which platforms were free
to operate without government oversight.43 Third, although this decision
functionally created the space for platforms to self-govern, the primarily
libertarian orientation towards Internet regulation— particularly in the
U.S.— meant that the potential effects of corporate power and dominance
were largely overlooked in favor of a focus on government censorship and
surveillance.44
Likewise, many early advocates of Internet freedom recognized— and
celebrated— the politics of online self-regulation, emphasizing the way in
which the Internet would afford new autonomy to speakers and listeners
without the existing constraints of government censorship.45 The formation of online communities had radical democratic roots. Thinkers such as
John Perry Barlow emphasized how the Internet infrastructure could invert
the political economy of the telecommunications, media, and entertainment industries, describing the relationship between the production and
consumption of information as being “as asymmetrical as that of bomber
to bombee [sic].”46 By creating spaces in which users created, curated,
edited, and responded to content, the Internet could wrest control of that
economy away from the media and entertainment industries.47
This vision of Internet freedom was often described as anarchic or
“cyber libertarian.”48 It is perhaps more accurately described as “popu42. See Bloch-Wehba, supra note 21, at 38 (describing how intermediary protections
reflect a neoliberal approach to regulation).
43. See Tarleton Gillespie, The Politics of ‘Platforms’, 12 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 347, 356
(2010) (describing platforms’ interest in “fostering a regulatory paradigm that gives
them the most leeway to conduct their business . . . .”); Klonick, supra note 10, at
1607– 08.
44. See ZUBOFF, supra note 13, at 104 (describing “a few consistent themes: that
technology companies such as Google move faster than the state’s ability to understand
or follow, that any attempts to intervene or constrain are therefore fated to be ill-conceived and stupid, that regulation is always a negative force that impedes innovation and
progress, and that lawlessness is the necessary context for ‘technological innovation.’”).
Cf. ELIZABETH ANDERSON, PRIVATE GOVERNMENT 40 (Princeton Univ. Press 2017) (“Should
we not subject these forms of government to at least as much critical scrutiny as we pay
to the democratic state?”); Zephyr Teachout & Lina Khan, Market Structure and Political
Law: A Taxonomy of Power, 9 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 37, 37 (2014).
45. John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, EFF (Feb. 8,
1996), https://www.eff.org/cyberspace-independence [https://perma.cc/W5YL-4QDP]
[hereinafter A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace].
46. John Perry Barlow, Death from Above, COMM. ACM, May 1995, at 17, 17.
47. See John Perry Barlow, Property and Speech: Who Owns What You Say in Cyberspace?, COMM. ACM, Dec. 1995, at 19, 20 (criticizing, in bombastic terms, the 1995
“White Paper,” for extending copyright protection and contracting fair use, to the benefit
of “media megacorps”). See also Michael Hauben & Ronda Hauben, The Social Forces
Behind the Development of Usenet, FIRST MONDAY, July 1998, https://firstmonday.org/
ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/609/530 [https://perma.cc/C6MA-2Z77] (“The audience has very little choice over what is emphasized by most mass media. Usenet, however, is controlled by its audience.”).
48. Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199, 1203– 04
(1998).
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list,” however, in the sense that it donned the mantle of popular support
and vigorous opposition to elite interests.49 Indeed, despite what Barlow
called the “natural anarchy” of the Internet, he also acknowledged its distinctive forms of social order.50 What he called the “unwritten codes” of
online participation— the largely informal norms, rules, and policies that
governed online services— were, in this telling, the expression of democratic self-governance, not instruments of censorship.51
Today, major platforms like Google, Facebook, and Twitter make rules
that indelibly affect what, how, and where users are able to speak.52 Platforms’ moderation rules affect public discourse; information flow; and
individual, free expression rights. Legal scholars who analyze these issues
from the perspective of free expression often see the substantive rules of
content moderation as performing an important, law-like function, setting
the boundaries of participation in an online community and the penalties
for non-compliance with those rules.53
That intermediary immunities that have created breathing room for
platforms to create their own, voluntary, quasi-regulatory speech constraints may seem ironic in light of the freewheeling libertarianism of early
Internet freedom advocates. But the proliferation of monitoring, filtering,
and moderation technologies is the direct result of intermediary immunities and safe harbors created to stimulate innovation.54 As Annemarie
Bridy pointed out, Section 230’s model of intermediary immunity both
allows platforms to take down speech that public actors could not censor,
and “frees them to develop and experiment with new tools for doing so,
including automated technical measures.”55
49. See, e.g., Margaret Canovan, Trust the People! Populism and the Two Faces of
Democracy, 47 POL. STUD. 2, 4 (1999) (“Populists claim legitimacy on the grounds that
they speak for the people: that is to say, they claim to represent the democratic sovereign,
not a sectional interest such as an economic class.”); Cas Mudde, The Populist Zeitgeist,
39 GOV’T & OPPOSITION 541, 541, 544 (2004).
50. See John Perry Barlow, The Great Work, COMM. ACM, Jan. 1992, at 25, 25– 26.
51. A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, supra note 45.
52. See Marvin Ammori, The “New” New York Times: Free Speech Lawyering in the
Age of Google and Twitter, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2259, 2260 (2014); Chander, supra note 10,
at 1809, 1816; Klonick, supra note 10, at 1616– 17; Sarah Myers West, Censored, Suspended, Shadowbanned: User Interpretations of Content Moderation on Social Media Platforms, 20 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 4366, 4366 (2018) [hereinafter Censored, Suspended,
Shadowbanned].
53. Klonick, supra note 10, at 1630; Rory Van Loo, The Corporation as Courthouse,
33 YALE J. ON REG. 547, 602 (2016).
54. Kate Klonick, Why the History of Content Moderation Matters, TECHDIRT (Jan. 30,
2018, 11:55 AM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20180129/21074939116/whyhistory-content-moderation-matters.shtml [https://perma.cc/E7G2-UQ4V] (“[M]ore
important than understanding the intricacies of the system is understanding the history
of how it was developed.”).
55. Annemarie Bridy, Leveraging CDA 230 to Counter Online Extremism, GEO. WASH.
PROGRAM ON EXTREMISM (Sept. 2019), https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/
zaxdzs2191/f/Leveraging%20230%20to%20Counter%20Online%20Extremism.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8SKA-KHNW].
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Spam Filtering

Made immune from legal responsibility for user-generated content,
web platforms could have become a free-for-all.56 But the “superabundant
resources” of the web were not inexhaustible.57 The burgeoning number of
web users put stress on some of the early web services.58 Trolling,59
spam,60 manipulation,61 and other kinds of misbehavior grew common.
These kinds of misbehavior had the potential to damage online communities and drained resources. Online communities reacted by developing
their own rules and restrictions to both, constrain online misbehavior, and
promote desirable behavior.
At least in theory, early Internet platforms lent themselves to forms of
moderation from the bottom up. For instance, Usenet newsgroups,— an
archetypal example of the dynamics of early cyberspace— were decentralized and could either be moderated or unmoderated.62 But whether moderated or not, Usenet was celebrated for its “uncensored” nature precisely
because it was cooperative and “controlled by its audience” rather than a
central authority.63 For Usenet, the power to moderate content went hand
in hand with the power to constitute a “community of interest.” In other
words, the power to engage in the explicitly political act of defining the
limits of acceptable behavior in a social group.64
Usenet’s experience with spam shows exactly how, despite its decentralization, the grassroots approach to online moderation in fact embraced
order over chaos. In 1994, two lawyers, Laurence Canter and Marsha
56. Klonick, supra note 10, at 1604.
57. MILTON L. MUELLER, NETWORKS AND STATES: THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF INTERNET
GOVERNANCE 2 (MIT Press 3d ed. 2010).
58. Ed Krol, It’s Time to Give Usenet a Much-Needed Overhaul, NETWORK WORLD, Apr.
1, 1996, at 65 (describing how, as Usenet grew, discussion groups got “too active” to be
sustainable).
59. Mattathias Schwartz, The Trolls Among Us, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2008), https://
www.nytimes.com/2008/08/03/magazine/03trolls-t.html [https://perma.cc/2M4CGP2R].
60. FINN BRUNTON, SPAM: A SHADOW HISTORY OF THE INTERNET xvi (MIT Press 2013)
(describing how spammers work “often by directly exploiting the same technologies and
beneficial effects that enable the communities on which they predate”).
61. Sara Kiesler et al., Regulating Behavior in Online Communities, in BUILDING SUCCESSFUL ONLINE COMMUNITIES: EVIDENCE-BASED SOCIAL DESIGN 125, 128 (Robert E. Kraut
& Paul Resnick eds., MIT Press 2011).
62. See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Taylor, Liability of Usenet Moderators for Defamation Published by Others: Flinging the Law of Defamation into Cyberspace, 47 FLA. L. REV. 247, 254
(1995). See also Martin Dodge & Rob Kitchin, MAPPING CYBERSPACE 135 (Routledge 1st
ed. 2001) (“Usenet can be thought of as the archetype of uncontrolled cyberspace, since
it is highly distributed, free-wheeling, and has no official funding, external quality control or censorship.”).
63. See Hauben & Hauben, supra note 47. See also JANET ABBATE, INVENTING THE
INTERNET 203 (MIT Press 1999) (describing how commercial providers began to “imitate” grassroots systems like Usenet through proprietary protocols).
64. See ABBATE, supra note 63, at 201. See also Anne Wells Branscomb, Anonymity,
Autonomy, and Accountability: Challenges to the First Amendment in Cyberspaces, 104
YALE L.J. 1639, 1656– 58 (1995) (describing how “netizens” have chosen to use moderation through voting).
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Siegel, sent mass messages to Usenet newsgroups with the subject line
“Green Card Lottery - Final One?” touting their own legal services— a massive violation of Usenet norms against unsolicited email.65 The reaction
was hostile, to say the least. Recipients sent “ ‘electronic letter bombs’
designed to destroy” the ads,66 and created an electronic beeper which
called the Canter & Siegel law offices repeatedly during the night, filling
their voicemail boxes.67
The Canter & Siegel incident became an infamous turning point for
online communications. Canter has been called “the father of modern
spam,”68 and the Green Card Lottery spam message is widely described as
the “public debut” of unsolicited commercial advertising on Usenet.69 But
rather than being the death of grassroots moderation, the Canter & Siegel
advertisement showed the flexibility and adaptability of the Usenet community. In part, Usenet users responded to the Canter & Siegel advertisement by organizing the community to implement ex ante screening
protocols to identify and flag, or delete, suspected spam.70
Canter and Siegel also showed the power and breadth of online commercial advertising at the very moment that commercialization and privatization of the Internet began to pick up speed.71 While the Internet’s
backbone had been formally transferred from military to civilian control in
1990, the National Science Foundation continued to run the backbone,
which specifically prohibited commercial activities.72 Throughout the
early and mid-1990s, however, new commercial network service providers
emerged, creating a new commercial infrastructure for the Internet that
ultimately replaced the old government-run backbone.73 In a 2002 interview, Canter reported that the Green Card Lottery incident had caused several service providers to terminate the Canter & Siegel account because
their servers lacked the capacity for the “huge amounts of traffic” that the
advertisement generated.74
As commercial infrastructure improved, and commercial email service
providers emerged, spam remained a universal annoyance. As a result, the
65. Branscomb, supra note 64, at 1656– 58; Lorrie Faith Cranor & Brian A.
LaMacchia, Spam!, COMM. ACM, Aug. 1998, at 74, 75.
66. See Branscomb, supra note 64, at 1658.
67. Id. at 1658 n.70.
68. The Father of Modern Spam Speaks, CNET (Mar. 26, 2002, 12:19 PM), https://
www.cnet.com/news/the-father-of-modern-spam-speaks/ [https://perma.cc/WM7ZQZJV].
69. Cranor & LaMacchia, supra note 65, at 74. See also Brian Hayes, Computing
Science: Spam, Spam, Spam, Lovely Spam, 91 AM. SCIENTIST 200, 200– 01 (2003).
70. See Hayes, supra note 69, at 200– 01. See also BRUNTON, supra note 60, at 96
(describing the formation of the news.admin.net-abuse.email newsgroup, or NANAE, to
respond to spam).
71. See The Father of Modern Spam Speaks, supra note 68 (“What we definitely
showed was that you could reach a lot of people— huge numbers of people! Today it
would be the equivalent to reaching millions relatively easily.”).
72. ABBATE, supra note 63, at 196 (explaining that “Congress was quick to condemn
any use of government-subsidized resources for commercial purposes”).
73. See id. at 197– 99.
74. The Father of Modern Spam Speaks, supra note 68.
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technology of spam filtering developed rapidly.75 In August 2002, Paul
Graham published A Plan for Spam, an essay that endorsed the use of
naı̈ve, Bayesian, statistical analysis for spam filtering.76 Graham’s
approach relied on a statistical analysis of tokens in two corpus— one of
spam, and one of non-spam— to determine the probability that a given message was spam.77 Graham’s statistical analysis laid the groundwork for
spam filtering technology that could adapt quickly over time as spammers
deployed new language to circumvent filters.78
Although governments also acted, the private sector proved more effective at enforcing anti-spam measures. When Congress enacted the CANSPAM Act in 2003, it regulated the structure of spam messages and certain
methods used to send them.79 At the end of the day, though, CAN-SPAM
proved difficult to enforce.80 Code-based spam filters, however, have dramatically improved the experience of email users.81 Technology companies have invested heavily in filtering technologies for spam, which
accounted for over 90% of all email by 2009.82 Platforms have also
extended spam filtering techniques to other categories of bad content
online.83
1.

“Artificial Intelligence”

Usenet’s response to Canter & Siegel demonstrated the power of social
norms as a moderating influence.84 But as platforms grew, expanded, and
commercialized, social norms provided less cohesion.85 Graham’s innovation illustrated how the social and legal norms of online content modera75. BRUNTON, supra note 60, at 126– 28 (describing spam research).
76. A Plan for Spam, PAUL GRAHAM (Aug. 2002), http://www.paulgraham.com/
spam.html [https://perma.cc/6VB8-4PSP] (last visited Mar. 2, 2020) [hereinafter GRAHAM]. See also BRUNTON, supra note 60, at 133– 35.
77. GRAHAM, supra note 76.
78. BRUNTON, supra note 60, at 140– 41.
79. Roger Allan Ford, Preemption of State Spam Laws by the Federal CAN-SPAM Act,
72 U. CHI. L. REV. 355, 358– 60 (2005).
80. Id. at 356.
81. Bradley Taylor et al., The War Against Spam: A Report from the Front Line, in NIPS
2007 WORKSHOP ON MACHINE LEARNING ADVERSARIAL ENVIRONMENTS FOR COMPUTER
SECURITY 1, 1, 3 (2007).
82. See generally Sarita Yardi et al., Detecting Spam in a Twitter Network, FIRST MONDAY, Jan. 2010, https://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/2793 [https://
perma.cc/K4FY-BPZY]. See also Spam (Unsolicited Commercial E-Mail): Hearing Before
the Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Transp., 108th Cong. 3 (2003) (opening statement of
Hon. John McCain, Chairman of the Committee).
83. See infra Section III.E.
84. Justin Peters, Original Sin: The Creation of Email Spam and Its Threat to the Promise of the Internet, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (2013), https://archives.cjr.org/critical_eye/
original_sin.php [https://perma.cc/5EKF-HSKZ].
85. Caitlin McLaughlin & Jessica Vitak, Norm Evolution and Violation on Facebook,
14 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 299, 300 (2012) (“Because of the speed at which these sites have
evolved, however, an established set of social norms guiding users’ behavior has been
slow to follow. Furthermore, when behavioral norms are ambiguous, it becomes more
difficult to both establish a formal set of norms and to respond to perceived norm
violations.”).
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tion could be encoded into architecture and design. The emerging
availability of filtering protocols and software meant that Usenet-style
social norms against spam could be formalized into code deployed at the
platform or provider level without draining platform resources.
As commercialized platforms developed an increasingly robust set of
rules and policies to guide participation on the platforms, they embraced
automated filtering as a critical tool for scaling the application of these
standards. This focus on scale is partly responsible for the transformation
that moderation has undergone from the grassroots of the early Internet
into the more “industrial” version we see today: moderation techniques
that rely heavily on both, ex ante, automated screening mechanisms, as
well as ex post review by human moderators (equally aided by
machines).86
Platforms seized the opportunity to use automated, ex ante screening
to exclude spam from their services, but their different business models
also meant that definitions of spam, and automated techniques to address
it, diverged.87 Gmail’s program policies prohibit— but do not define—
“spam,” and remind users to “keep in mind that [their] definition of ‘unsolicited’ or ‘unwanted’ mail may differ from [the] email recipients’ perception.”88 In contrast, Facebook’s community standards prohibit
“commercial spam,” and explicitly instruct users not to “artificially
increase distribution for financial gain.”89 YouTube’s community guidelines prohibit “spam, scams, and other deceptive practices that take advantage of the YouTube community,” including voter suppression.90 These
differences not only demonstrate that the very definition of prohibited
“spam” can vary greatly even between major mainstream communities, but
also that the technical and quasi-legal architecture of filtering can flexibly
accommodate different kinds of restrictions.
Intermediary immunities and safe harbor protections allowed platforms to disclose their content-filtering mechanisms. Even so, companies
have struggled to ensure that their abuse detection “scales” to meet the
needs of global communication.91 The problem is that “the more ambiguous and contextual classificatory criteria become, the more difficult it
86. Robyn Caplan, Content or Context Moderation?: Artisinal, Community-Reliant, and
Industrial Approaches, DATA & SOC’Y (Nov. 14, 2018), https://datasociety.net/library/
content-or-context-moderation/ [https://perma.cc/V74Z-P4AM]. See also Gorwa et al.,
supra note 17, at 7– 10.
87. Cf. The Virtues of Moderation, supra note 28, at 67– 68 (distinguishing between ex
ante and ex post).
88. Gmail Program Policies, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/gmail/about/policy/
[https://perma.cc/D8NH-X8AD] (last visited Feb. 5, 2020).
89. Community Standards: Spam, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/commun
itystandards/spam [https://perma.cc/E2KM-2QQC] (last visited Feb. 5, 2020).
90. Spam, Deceptive Practices & Scams Policies, YOUTUBE, https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2801973?hl=en [https://perma.cc/L4YJ-4R6H] (last
visited Feb. 5, 2020).
91. Taylor et al., supra note 81, at 3 (describing the challenges of internationalizing
machine learning for spam filters).
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becomes to train algorithms accurately.”92 Compared to contextual decisions about whether a depiction of violence is a piece of extremist content
or a human rights report about extremism, spam is relatively easy. For
example, Bayesian filters would respond as spammers started to use
“v14gr4” instead of “Viagra.”93
While platforms often tout the sophistication of their machine learning methods, these methods often falter in significant ways. Consider Perspective API (Perspective), a popular machine learning system developed by
Google and Jigsaw to help combat trolling and “improve conversations
online.”94 In 2017, University of Washington researchers demonstrated
how easily Perspective could be fooled, finding that “an adversary can subtly modify a toxic phrase”— for example, by misspelling the word “idiots” as
“idiiots,” “id.iots,” or “i.diots”— to significantly lower the “toxicity score”
and the likelihood that a comment would be classified as “rude” or trolling.95 This year, researchers also demonstrated that Perspective disproportionately identifies posts written in African-American Vernacular
English as “rude” or “toxic,” reflecting— and amplifying— racial bias.96
Despite their drawbacks, machine learning and artificial intelligence
are critical tools for scaling content moderation. Indeed, stemming the tide
of bad content became a matter of corporate survival. Spam filtering illustrated the potential benefits automation held for both, users and platforms
seeking to limit certain kinds of online content. Today, platforms employ a
variety of techniques to make content-related decisions far beyond spam.
Just as Graham’s Plan for Spam approach prescribed Bayesian analysis to
help an algorithm predict the likelihood that a given email was spam, modern automated techniques often use machine learning algorithms to predict the likelihood that a piece of content violates the platforms’ rules or
the law.97 Like spam, much of this content, while undesirable, is not ille92. Kirsten Gollatz et al., The Turn to Artificial Intelligence in Governing Communication Online, HIIG 1, 7 (2018), https://www.hiig.de/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Work
shop-Report-2018-Turn-to-AI.pdf [https://perma.cc/VUS2-HLAP].
93. GRAHAM, supra note 76 (explaining his optimism that Bayesian filters would
respond as spammers started to use “‘c0ck’ instead of ‘cock’”).
94. See generally PERSPECTIVE, https://www.perspectiveapi.com/#/home [https://
perma.cc/2GAY-5X77] (last visited Jan. 31, 2020).
95. Hossein Hosseini et al., Deceiving Google’s Perspective API Built for Detecting Toxic
Comments, ARXIV 1, 2 tbl.1 (2017), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1702.08138.pdf [https://
perma.cc/TV3A-9CBG].
96. Maarten Sap et al., The Risk of Racial Bias in Hate Speech Detection, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 57TH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE ASSOCIATION OF COMPUTATIONAL LINGUISTICS
1668, 1668– 70, 1677 (ACL 2019); Anna Chung, How Automated Tools Discriminate
Against Black Language, MEDIUM (Feb. 28, 2019), https://onezero.medium.com/howautomated-tools-discriminate-against-black-language-2ac8eab8d6db [https://perma.cc/
5EZG-TVWP]. See also Thomas Davidson et al., Racial Bias in Hate Speech and Abusive
Language Detection Datasets, ARXIV 1, 5– 8 (2019), https://arxiv.org/pdf/
1905.12516v1.pdf [https://perma.cc/V3YG-R7CZ] (demonstrating “substantial racial
disparities” in the performance of language classifiers intended to detect hate speech
and abusive language).
97. See Natasha Duarte et al., Mixed Messages? The Limits of Automated Social Media
Content Analysis, CTR. DEMOCRACY & TECH. (Nov. 28, 2017), https://cdt.org/insights/
mixed-messages-the-limits-of-automated-social-media-content-analysis/ [https://
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gal. Platforms use keyword filters to exclude hashtags that promote disordered eating;98 analyze the content of photographs to determine whether
they include “adult content;”99 and exclude posts that use politically sensitive terms.100
C.

Unlawful Content

Automated, proactive screening is not limited to legal content that platforms simply find distasteful, too resource-intensive, or would otherwise
prefer not to host. Technology companies have also developed tools that
use fingerprinting and hashing technologies to flag and limit the distribution of illegal content. Many of the content-related decisions that platforms
seek to automate often require more context and judgment than determining whether an email should go to the recipient’s inbox or junk folder, and
also have higher stakes.
Unlike Bayesian filtering or other content-based automated screening
techniques, which predict the likelihood that a piece of content should be
taken down, fingerprinting and hashing technologies essentially work by
screening the characteristics of user-uploaded content against an existing
database of characteristics that indicate illegality.101 In order to screen
user-generated content, fingerprinting and hashing technologies require a
library of content that has already been determined to possess the relevant
characteristics.102
Many platforms rely on sophisticated hashing technology to identify
and prevent the re-upload of specific child sexual abuse images.103 “Hashing” means to apply a mathematical function that generates a series of
characters to identify a given input.104 For example, one might use a hash
function to generate a string of characters to identify a photograph, a text
perma.cc/M8FS-R2XM] (outlining how spam filtering gave rise to different natural language processing techniques).
98. Stevie Chancellor et al., #Thyghgapp: Instagram Content Moderation and Lexical
Variation in Pro-Eating Disorder Communities, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 19TH ACM CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER-SUPPORTED COOPERATIVE WORK & SOCIAL COMPUTING 1201 (ACM
2016); Ysabel Gerrard, Beyond the Hashtag: Circumventing Content Moderation on Social
Media, 20 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 4492, 4494– 96 (2018).
99. Shannon Liao, Tumblr Will Ban All Adult Content on December 17th, VERGE (Dec.
3, 2018, 12:26 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2018/12/3/18123752/tumblr-adultcontent-porn-ban-date-explicit-changes-why-safe-mode [https://perma.cc/EKL5-CHUG].
100. See generally David Bamman et al., Censorship and Deletion Practices in Chinese
Social Media, FIRST MONDAY, Mar. 2012, https://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/download/3943/3169 [https://perma.cc/S2TH-773X].
101. See generally Gorwa et al., supra note 17.
102. Id. at 2.
103. See Jeff Kosseff, Private Computer Searches and the Fourth Amendment, 14 I/S: J.L.
& POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 187, 209 (2018). See, e.g., PhotoDNA, MICROSOFT, https://
www.microsoft.com/en-us/photodna [https://perma.cc/J5MV-Y7FU] (last visited June
21, 2020).
104. Dennis Martin, Note, Demystifying Hash Searches, 70 STAN. L. REV. 691, 695
(2018).
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file, or the contents of a hard drive.105
PhotoDNA, a tool developed by Microsoft and licensed for free to technology companies and law enforcement, can match the hash values of
photos or videos uploaded by individual users against a database of hash
values of other photos or videos containing illegal images of child sexual
abuse.106 If PhotoDNA finds a match between user-generated content and
known child sexual abuse imagery, the software sends a “CyberTip”
directly to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children.107
Using PhotoDNA, law enforcement can “identify child pornography with
almost absolute certainty, regardless of the name associated with a file.”108
Technology companies are not required by law to use proactive monitoring or filtering to detect child sexual abuse imagery, but rather have
done so voluntarily.109 Under the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools
to end the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003 (PROTECT Act),
companies that obtain “actual knowledge” of child pornography are
required to report it to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children.110 Despite being shielded from liability, platforms have undertaken
extensive voluntary action to limit illegal online content, as the PhotoDNA
example illustrates. An online service provider might develop these programs for its own purposes, such as to “protect its own business and reputation and to protect the users” of its systems.111
Similarly, platforms are also adopting methods of proactive, ex ante
screening for violent extremist and terrorist content in response to national
and global pressures.112 In 2016, in response to pressure by European
governments, several major technology companies formed a consortium,
the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism (GIFCT), and announced
that they would create a “shared industry database of ‘hashes’— unique digital ‘fingerprints’— for violent terrorist imagery or terrorist recruitment
videos or images.”113 The hash database deploys a technology similar to
that used in countering child sexual abuse imagery: participants in the
effort build a database of hash values that serve as identifiers for files
105. Richard P. Salgado, Fourth Amendment Search and the Power of the Hash, 119
HARV. L. REV. F. 38, 39 (2006) (replying to Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital
World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531 (2005)).
106. See generally id.; PhotoDNA, supra note 103.
107. United States v. Reddick, 900 F.3d 636, 637– 38 (5th Cir. 2018).
108. United States v. Larman, 547 F. App’x 475, 477 (5th Cir. 2013).
109. 18 U.S.C. § 2258A(a)(1) (2008); Susan Klein & Crystal Flinn, Social Media Compliance Programs and the War Against Terrorism, 8 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 53, 78– 79 (2017).
110. Klein & Flinn, supra note 109, at 78 (citing to PL 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837 (1984),
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5773(b) (2015)).
111. United States v. Green, 857 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1018 (S.D. Cal. 2012) (quoting
testimony of Don Colcolough, AOL’s Director of Investigations and Cyber Security). See
also United States v. Keith, 980 F. Supp. 2d 33, 40 (D. Mass. 2013) (finding that AOL
had “an important business reason” for its Image Detection and Filtering Process, or
IDFP).
112. See generally Bloch-Wehba, supra note 21.
113. Partnering to Help Curb the Spread of Terrorist Content Online, GOOGLE (Dec. 5,
2016), https://blog.google/topics/google-europe/partnering-help-curb-spread-terroristcontent-online/ [https://perma.cc/5Z6H-P4Z3].
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known to correspond to violent extremist or terrorist content.114
Though platforms are not required to screen for “terrorist” content,
they have proudly advertised their abilities to do so. For instance,
Facebook expressed support for automated content deletion for terrorist
content before the European Commission, noting that the platform had
removed 99% of ISIS and Al-Qaeda terror content before it had been flagged by users.115 YouTube’s most recent report, documenting the enforcement of its Community Guidelines, likewise states that “automated
flagging enables us to act more quickly and accurately to enforce our
policies.”116
Platforms’ proactive initiatives are largely a response to escalating
threats of regulatory action by the European Commission.117 In the EU,
the Terrorism Directive explicitly calls for exploring the possibility of “voluntary action” by platforms or by state actors to “detect[ ] and flag[ ]” terrorist content online pursuant to platforms’ terms of service.118 The
European Commission was dissatisfied with platforms’ approach to proactive filtering and followed up with a recommendation on “measures to
effectively tackle illegal content online.”119 The recommendation exhorted
platforms to take “proportionate and specific proactive measures, including by using automated means,” to find, remove, and prevent the reposting
of terrorist content.120 Recognizing that the use of automated filtering
would be difficult for smaller platforms, the Commission also
“encourage[d]” platforms to “cooperate” in sharing technological tools to
curb terrorist content.121
Until spring of 2019, political pressures to address violent extremism
were largely limited to Islamic terrorism. That changed, however, after the
March 2019 shootings at the Masjid al Noor and Linwood Islamic Centre
in Christchurch, New Zealand prompted a wave of responses from platforms and government actors reconsidering the role of social media in
114. See Daphne Keller, Internet Platforms: Observations on Speech, Danger, and
Money 6 (Hoover Inst. Aegis Paper Series No. 1807, 2018) [hereinafter Internet Platforms]; T.J. McIntyre, Child Abuse Images and Cleanfeeds: Assessing Internet Blocking Systems, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON GOVERNANCE OF THE INTERNET 277, 288 (Ian Brown ed.,
Edward Elgar 2013).
115. European Commission Press Release IP/17/5105, Fighting Terrorism Online:
Internet Forum Pushes for Automatic Detection of Terrorist Propaganda (Dec. 6, 2017)
(Monika Bickert, Director of Global Policy Management, Facebook, stated that “[t]he use
of AI and other automation to stop the spread of terrorist content is showing promise.”).
116. YouTube Community Guidelines Enforcement, GOOGLE, https://transparency
report.google.com/youtube-policy/removals?hl=en [https://perma.cc/2YWV-5SSH] (last
visited Mar. 2, 2020).
117. Bloch-Wehba, supra note 21, at 43.
118. Directive 2017/541, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March
2017 on Combating Terrorism and Replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/
JHA and Amending Council Decision 2005/671/JHA, 2017 O.J. (L 88) 6, 9 (EU).
119. Commission Recommendation of 1 March 2018 on Measures to Effectively Tackle
Illegal Content Online, at 1, 2, C(2018) 1177 final (Mar. 1, 2018) (EC).
120. Id. at 8.
121. Id.
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amplifying hatred and violence.122 The shooter, who streamed on
Facebook Live for seventeen minutes as he killed fifty-one people, had
released a white supremacist manifesto that continued to circulate online
well after New Zealand banned its possession.123 Facebook, YouTube, and
Instagram faced questions about why and how restricted footage and
imagery from the shooting continued to resurface on their platforms.124
While Facebook had historically banned white supremacist content, it
did not take steps to eliminate white nationalism and white separatism
from the platform until after Christchurch.125 YouTube similarly changed
its policy in June 2019 to prohibit “videos alleging that a group is superior
in order to justify discrimination, segregation or exclusion based on qualities like age, gender, race, caste, religion, sexual orientation or veteran status.”126 Christchurch came in the midst of a string of other mass killings
linked to white nationalism. In the U.S., mass murderers at the Tree of Life
Synagogue in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; the Chabad of Poway, California;
and the Walmart in El Paso, Texas all posted white nationalist manifestos
on social media. The Poway and El Paso shooters explicitly cited Christchurch as inspiration.127
Governments and platforms appeared to re-double their efforts to
address violent extremism after Christchurch. In May 2019, New Zealand
and France led a meeting of government actors, technology companies, and
civil society organizations at which they adopted the Christchurch Call to
Action to Eliminate Terrorist and Violent Extremist Content Online
(Christchurch Call). The Christchurch Call is a non-binding agreement
committing the signatories— dozens of nations and major technology companies including Amazon, Facebook, Google, Microsoft, Twitter, and YouTube— to “work collectively” to “counter violent extremism in all its forms”
and to “accelerate research into and development of technical solutions to
prevent the upload of and to detect and immediately remove terrorist and
122. See Inside the Team at Facebook That Dealt with the Christchurch Shooting, supra
note 3 (describing how content moderation teams struggled to keep up with the
footage).
123. Charles Anderson, Censor Bans ‘Manifesto’ of Christchurch Mosque Shooter,
GUARDIAN (Mar. 23, 2019, 10:53 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/mar/
24/censor-bans-manifesto-of-christchurch-mosque-shooter [https://perma.cc/94UM4TLG]; Charlotte Graham-McLay, Spreading the Mosque Shooting Video Is a Crime in New
Zealand, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/21/world/
asia/new-zealand-attacks-social-media.html [https://perma.cc/TLP2-8G3S].
124. James Rogers, Horrific Footage of Christchurch Mosque Shooting Surfaces on YouTube and Instagram, FOX NEWS (Aug. 6, 2019), https://www.foxnews.com/tech/footagechristchurch-mosque-shooting-youtube-instagram [https://perma.cc/994Z-JZMP].
125. Standing Against Hate, FACEBOOK (Mar. 27, 2019), https://about.fb.com/news/
2019/03/standing-against-hate/ [https://perma.cc/Y24X-NQJ4].
126. Our Ongoing Work to Tackle Hate, YOUTUBE (June 5, 2019), https://youtube.googleblog.com/2019/06/our-ongoing-work-to-tackle-hate.html [https://perma.cc/
6WZV-Y5GP].
127. Tim Arango et al., Minutes Before El Paso Killing, Hate-Filled Manifesto Appears
Online, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/03/us/patrickcrusius-el-paso-shooter-manifesto.html [https://perma.cc/K4TK-B5J9].
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violent extremist content online.”128
At the same time, GIFCT publicly committed to a range of action steps
to implement the Christchurch Call goals, including investing in AI-based
and fingerprinting technologies to “detect and remove terrorist and violent
extremist content.”129 A few months later, GIFCT announced that it would
become its own independent organization, a step that would allow it to “do
even more”— but which prompted critics to wonder about the continuing
influence of dominant platforms.130
While the threat of regulation is a powerful motivation for platforms to
synchronize their actions with law enforcement goals, platforms also have
significant business incentives to voluntarily prevent their services from
being used to spread horrific illegal content. And in the context of illegal,
online content, automated flagging has proven to be a powerful opportunity for collaboration and cooperation between the private and public sectors. In fact, as with many forms of cybercrime, close cooperation between
the government and private sector is critical for successful prosecution.131
These concerns have been particularly pronounced because of the
emergence of “Internet Referral Units (IRUs),” which are specialized police
units that monitor online activity for terms of service violations and cybercrime.132 Several major companies have partnered with these units as
“trusted flaggers” whose complaints receive expedited treatment.133 IRUs’
use of the mechanisms of private governance for law enforcement purposes
has raised concerns about the transparency, accountability, and redress
mechanisms for censorship.134
128. Christchurch Call to Eliminate Terrorist & Violent Extrimist Content Online,
CHRISTCHURCH CALL (2019), https://www.christchurchcall.com/christchurch-call.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4DVS-RZPJ].
129. Actions to Address the Abuse of Technology to Spread Terrorist and Violent Extremist Content, GIFCT (May 15, 2019), https://gifct.org/press/actions-address-abuse-technology-spread-terrorist-and-violent-extremist-content/ [https://perma.cc/TB7T-W874];
Ángel Dı́az, Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism’s ‘Transparency Report’ Raises
More Questions Than Answers, JUST SEC. (Sept. 25, 2019), https://www.justsecurity.org/
66298/gifct-transparency-report-raises-more-questions-than-answers/ [https://perma
.cc/BH5S-EVYJ]; Andrew Sullivan, Looking the GIFCT in the Mouth, INTERNET SOC’Y (Oct.
11, 2019), https://www.internetsociety.org/blog/2019/10/looking-the-gifct-in-themouth/ [https://perma.cc/NT9B-UBAU]. See also Emma Llansó, Platforms Want Centralized Censorship. That Should Scare You, WIRED (Apr. 18, 2019, 9:00 AM), https://
www.wired.com/story/platforms-centralized-censorship/ [https://perma.cc/GN69GZYL].
130. Next Steps for GIFCT, GIFCT (Sept. 23, 2019), https://gifct.org/press/next-stepsgifct/ [https://perma.cc/X2YR-WUZJ].
131. See, e.g., Kristen E. Eichensehr, Public-Private Cybersecurity, 95 TEX. L. REV. 467,
474 (2017).
132. See Brian Chang, From Internet Referral Units to International Agreements: Censorship of the Internet by the UK and EU, 49 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 114, 120– 22
(2018).
133. Bloch-Wehba, supra note 21, at 45– 46.
134. Jason Pielemeier & Chris Sheehy, Understanding the Human Rights Risks Associated with Internet Referral Units, MEDIUM (Feb. 25, 2019), https://medium.com/globalnetwork-initiative-collection/understanding-the-human-rights-risks-associated-withinternet-referal-units-by-jason-pielemeier-b0b3feeb95c9 [https://perma.cc/A8CJ-AL5J].
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Despite the increasingly intertwined relationship between business
and law enforcement interests, platforms’ powerful role is subject to little
oversight or accountability. Many of the most powerful techniques to
address crime, such as the terrorism and child sexual abuse hash
databases, are formally private and voluntary.135 These techniques are
specifically designed to ferret out unlawful content, and in the case of child
sexual abuse imagery, to actually report it to the police.136 However, there
is scant judicial or public oversight of these practices despite the close relation between platform reporting and law enforcement interests. Moreover,
technology companies rarely seem to consider the role of their business
models in whetting the public’s appetite for the very unlawful or undesirable content that they seek to suppress.137
D.

Copyright Enforcement

Ex ante content recognition technologies developed by the private sector have also transformed copyright enforcement. In response to copyright
takedown requests, companies have responded with a range of technical
approaches, including facilitating site-wide deletion of content,138 and
employing hashing or fingerprinting to identify and filter infringing content.139 These technologies have fundamentally altered intellectual property enforcement online.140
Under Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998
(DMCA), online service providers are generally immune from secondary
liability for copyright infringement when users transmit infringing material through their platforms, unless the provider has “actual knowledge” or
“awareness” of the infringing content.141 Europe has historically also
embraced safe harbors for intermediary service providers that host usergenerated content. Under the European Commission’s E-Commerce Direc135. See discussion supra Section I.C.
136. United States v. Rosenschein, No. CR 16-4571 JCH, 2019 WL 4855428, at *6
(D.N.M. Oct. 2, 2019). In the United States, numerous federal courts have held that
online service providers are not government “agents.” But in one case, discovery as to
the nature of the relationship between PhotoDNA and law enforcement is still ongoing.
Id. (agreeing to “honor Microsoft’s commitment to provide agreements pertaining to
PhotoDNA and any federal law enforcement agency or State Attorney General, and
agreements with third parties regarding hash sharing.”). See also United States v. Stevenson, 727 F.3d 826, 831 (8th Cir. 2013); United States v. Richardson, 607 F.3d 357, 367
(4th Cir. 2010).
137. See Julia Alexander, YouTube Still Can’t Stop Child Predators in Its Comments,
VERGE (Feb. 19, 2019, 12:50 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2019/2/19/18229938/
youtube-child-exploitation-recommendation-algorithm-predators [https://perma.cc/
4T4P-2E4S].
138. Copyright Management Tools, YOUTUBE, https://support.google.com/youtube/
answer/9245819?hl=en&ref_topic=9282364 [https://perma.cc/2AYX-F6A4] (last visited
Jan. 31, 2019).
139. Alexander, supra note 137.
140. Annemarie Bridy, Graduated Response and the Turn to Private Ordering in Online
Copyright Enforcement, 89 OR. L. REV. 81, 93– 94 (2010); Annemarie Bridy, Internet Payment Blockades, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1523, 1538 n. 100 (2015) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 512 (a)– (d)
(2012)).
141. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A) (1999).
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tive, member states may not hold intermediary service providers liable for
content posted by users, so long as providers lack “actual knowledge of
illegal activity or information,” or “act[ ] expeditiously to remove or to disable access” once they gain knowledge.142
Both the European and U.S. regimes are reactive, not proactive, and
emphasize the need for timely deletion upon request: a “notice and takedown” regime.143 Providers generally only “know” of infringement once a
copyright holder notifies the provider that a specific piece of content
infringes their copyright. Both Section 512 of the DMCA and the
E-Commerce Directive explicitly disavow the intention to require service
providers to monitor content that was hosted for or generated by users for
illegality.144 Under the DMCA, service providers have no statutory obligations to “monitor” their platforms or “affirmatively seek[ ] facts indicating
infringing activity,” unless doing so is a “standard technical measure.”145
The E-Commerce Directive likewise bars member states from imposing
general obligations on intermediaries “to monitor the information which
they transmit or store, nor a general obligation actively to seek facts or
circumstances indicating illegal activity.”146 In addition, Article 10 of the
European Convention on Human Rights also limits third-party liability for
user-generated online content on free expression grounds.147
While service providers were not required to develop or deploy proactive monitoring or filtering techniques, they soon did so anyway. The
scope and extent of copyright infringement made ex post notice and takedown a deeply unsatisfying remedy for copyright holders, who also urged
legislators and regulators to require platforms to do more to stem the tide
of infringing content.148 In 1997, a number of commercial copyright owners and providers of user-generated content (UGC) services entered into
142. E-Commerce Directive 2000/31, supra note 40, at art. 14.
143. See Jennifer M. Urban et al., Notice and Takedown: Online Service Provider and
Rightsholder Accounts of Everyday Practice, 64 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 371, 373 (2017).
144. 17 U.S.C. § 512(m); E-Commerce Directive 2000/31, supra note 40, at art. 15.
145. 17 U.S.C. § 512(m)(1). Cf. id. § 512(i)(2) (defining “standard technical measures” as measures that are “developed pursuant to a broad consensus of copyright owners and service providers in an open, fair, voluntary, multi-industry standards process;
are available to any person on reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms; and do not
impose substantial costs on service providers or substantial burdens on their systems or
networks.”). See also Lital Helman & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Best Available Technology Standard, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1194, 1200 (2011) (“[S]ection 512 does not require
webhosts to monitor content on their site ex ante as a prerequisite for enjoying the safe
harbor.”).
146. E-Commerce Directive 2000/31, supra note 40, at art. 15.
147. See Magyar Tartalomszolgáltatók Egyesülete v. Hungary, 2016 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1,
11– 15 (finding that Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)
limits third-party liability for online content); but see Delfi AS v. Estonia, 2013 Eur. Ct.
H.R. 1, 33– 34 (finding that imposing liability for unlawful, online hate speech does not
offend Article 10 of the ECHR).
148. COHEN, supra note 10, at 123– 24 (describing the copyright wars). See also NICOLAS P. SUZOR, LAWLESS: THE SECRET RULES THAT GOVERN OUR DIGITAL LIVES 76– 78 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2019) (describing efforts to pass the Stop Online Piracy Act and the
Preventing Real Online Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of Intellectual Property
Act, and require Internet platforms to do more to combat infringement).
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the “UGC Principles,” a non-binding set of principles that, among other
things, called for UGC services to use “effective content identification technology” to eliminate infringing content from their services.149
YouTube’s fingerprinting technology, Content ID, is a prime example
of automated copyright enforcement.150 Content ID, created in 2007,
matches references submitted by copyright owners against user uploads to
YouTube’s website.151 Using Content ID and similar fingerprint-based systems, rightsholders can opt to block infringing content in user-generated
videos. Large rightsholders have developed automated mechanisms to
detect, track, and report online infringement as well as to generate takedown requests.152 And service providers have also adopted automated
means to respond to notices of claimed infringement, thereby “automat[ing] the process in order to manage floods of requests.”153
But Content ID illustrates that the dispute about proactive filtering of
infringing content is not merely about deleting or blocking said content.
Automated copyright enforcement has also enabled rightsholders to
explore other remedies beyond takedown. For example, in addition to
blocking content, Content ID also allows rightsholders to monetize that
content— to redirect any revenue from the user who generated the video to
the rightsholder— or to track the usage of that content.154 The ability to
monitor and monetize infringement remedies what rightsholders call the
“value gap”155 between what YouTube pays for monetized content and
what services such as Spotify or Pandora, which license content directly
from rightsholders, pay. Automated copyright enforcement provides a
wealth of avenues for rightsholders to redress the “value gap” through
means other than blocking access to content, for example, by monetizing or
surveilling the usage or viewing patterns of content.156
149. Principles for User Generated Content Services, UGC, https://ugcprinciples.com
[https://perma.cc/V4XQ-PPXG] (last visited Apr. 16, 2020). See also Lauren G. Gallo,
The (Im)possibility of “Standard Technical Measures” for UGC Websites, 34 COLUM. J.L. &
ARTS 283, 295 (2011) (describing how “all major right holders and all major UGCs,”
even the ones that had declined to join the UGC Principles, had adopted some kind of
content fingerprinting technology).
150. Annemarie Bridy, The Price of Closing the “Value Gap”: How the Music Industry
Hacked EU Copyright Reform, 22 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH L. 323, 330 (2020) [hereinafter
The Price of Closing the “Value Gap”].
151. Qualifying for Content ID, YOUTUBE, https://support.google.com/youtube/
answer/1311402 [https://perma.cc/Y6XV-LQUN] (last visited Apr. 16, 2020).
152. Niva Elkin-Koren, Fair Use by Design, 64 UCLA L. REV. 1082, 1087 (2017);
Urban et al., supra note 143, at 374.
153. Elkin-Koren, supra note 152, at 1087.
154. See Perel & Elkin-Koren, supra note 11, at 480, 510. See also Miguel Helft, Google
Told to Turn Over User Data of YouTube, N.Y. TIMES (July 4, 2008), https://
www.nytimes.com/2008/07/04/technology/04youtube.html [https://perma.cc/E6QND5JA] (describing how, in the Viacom contributory infringement case against YouTube,
YouTube was required to produce data regarding user viewing histories).
155. See, e.g., Medium: Five Stubborn Truths About YouTube and the Value Gap, RIAA
NEWS (Aug. 18, 2017), https://www.riaa.com/medium-five-stubborn-truths-youtubevalue-gap/ [https://perma.cc/ECV6-CH2X].
156. See, e.g., AUDIBLE MAGIC, https://www.audiblemagic.com/ [https://perma.cc/
2C6M-XCB4] (last visited Apr. 16, 2020).
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As technology has facilitated faster and farther-reaching takedown
requests, many have cautioned that compliance with this framework may
lead to over-deletion of lawful content. In particular, as one important
study of notice and takedown found, “the rise of mass notice sending via
automated systems raises immediate questions of accuracy and due process,” because the sheer scale of automated notice sending makes it difficult to analyze the legal issues presented or understand whether notices are
sent with bad faith.157
The architecture of Content ID, Audible Magic, and similar “fingerprinting” technologies also necessarily raises difficult questions about context. Fingerprinting techniques work by automatically screening usergenerated content against an existing database of copyright-protected content: any clip of copyrighted material that matches protected content will
be flagged as infringement.158 The result is that, in their current form,
automated systems for detecting copyright infringement are often incapable of detecting uses of copyrighted works that are non-infringing, including fair use.159 The same is true for other exceptions that carve out other
kinds of creative reuses of copyrighted materials, including “quotation,
criticism, and review,” or “caricature, parody, or pastiche.”160
The need for an authoritative set of unlawful content, therefore, limits
the applications of hash- or fingerprint-based technology. Consider the difficulty of using a fingerprinting approach to identify “hate speech.” Compiling an authoritative set of “hate speech” would be impossible in its own
right, and any effort to do so would be necessarily, indelibly influenced by
political and social judgment. For instance, while it is a criminal offense
under German law to display a swastika, the law recognizes several context-dependent exceptions, including “to promote art or science, research
or teaching, reporting about current or historical events, or similar purposes.”161 A fingerprinting-based approach that identified photographs of
swastikas as impermissible would also include journalism, art, and
research in its sweep. It is nearly impossible to imagine such an approach
being useful to platforms or to law enforcement.
While fingerprinting and hashing technologies are unlikely to helpfully address highly context-dependent questions, they are quite effective
modes of public-private cooperation on policing content that is predetermined to be unlawful.162 This explains their use in settings like child sex157. Urban et al., supra note 143, at 406– 09.
158. Core Technology & Services Overview, AUDIBLE MAGIC (2015), https://www.audi
blemagic.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/AM_overview_datasheet_150406.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z6AU-HN89] (describing “fingerprint” technology).
159. See Is Online Copyright Enforcement Scalable?, supra note 11, at 715.
160. See Article 13 in 10 Questions, ARTICLE 13, https://www.article13.org/faq [https:/
/perma.cc/ULE4-6QU4] (last visited Apr. 16, 2020).
161. STRAFGESETZBUCH [StGB] [PENAL CODE], § 86, para. 3, translation at https://
www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stgb/englisch_stgb.html [https://perma.cc/BDU47PGM] (Ger.).
162. See, e.g., Martin, supra note 104, at 701 (describing how the National Software
Reference Library provides hash sets for standard files to law enforcement to ease computer searches).
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ual abuse imagery, in which a speaker is liable regardless of context.163
But today, the content moderation decisions that platforms often seek to
automate require more contextual analysis and human judgment than
screening for unlawful content. Thus, platforms increasingly rely upon a
combination of fingerprinting approaches, machine learning, and human
decision-making to engage in content moderation. As large platforms set
and enforce ground rules for membership, participation, and exclusion
from online communities, they rely on a “bionic” combination of ex ante
automated screening with ex post analysis by human moderators and
algorithmic decision-making technologies.164
II.

From Reactive to Proactive

Put simply, although the dominant mode of regulating unlawful content was reactive, platforms quickly developed their own proactive methodologies, transforming their ability to enforce private rules and lending their
technological capabilities to the enforcement of offline laws. Today, however, the terms of these bargains are dramatically contested, as lawmakers
in Europe and elsewhere consider and adopt requirements that platforms
engage in ex ante monitoring and filtering.
In the discussion that follows, this Part maps new proactive monitoring requirements along several axes: the expanding role of private enforcement of technology and quasi-legal protections as instruments of private
governance, the relationship between law enforcement agencies and private entities, the expansion of the kinds of content considered unlawful,
and the dueling emphases on rapid takedowns and due process for restoring wrongfully deleted content. As platforms invest in artificial intelligence
and algorithmic content moderation to counter the flood of toxic information, other government actors are seizing on their promises about the
capacity of technology and asking platforms to do even more to proactively
head off these threats.
A.

Copyright

Article 17 of the EU Copyright Directive (Article 17), which was formerly known as Article 13, has fundamentally altered Europe’s intermediary safe harbor protections.165 Article 17 makes “online content-sharing
service providers” liable when users upload copyright-infringing content
163. See Gabriel J.X. Dance & Michael H. Keller, How Laws Against Child Sexual Abuse
Imagery Can Make It Harder to Detect, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2019), https://
www.nytimes.com/2019/11/12/us/online-child-sex-abuse.html [https://perma.cc/
4TQS-9HW9] (explaining how the ban on possessing or viewing child sexual abuse
imagery has slowed down the private sector’s development of new tools to detect it).
164. See Content Moderation: The Future is Bionic, ACCENTURE 1, 2 (2017), https://
www.accenture.com/cz-en/_acnmedia/PDF-47/Accenture-Webscale-New-Content-Mod
eration-POV.pdf [https://perma.cc/RP2Q-W42W].
165. Directive 2019/790, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April
2019 on Copyright and Related Rights in the Digital Single Market and Amending Directives 96/9/EC and 2001/29/EC, art. 17, 2019 O.J. (L 130) 92, 120 [hereinafter Copyright Directive 2019/790].
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unless the providers make their “best efforts” to license the content from
the rights holder.166 In addition, the new provisions require providers to
“ensure the unavailability” of unlicensed content and to “expeditiously”
remove and block future uploads of infringing content.167 The provisions
will apply to any provider that is over three years old, no matter how small,
raising concerns that they will further entrench the dominance of existing
platforms.168
Although Article 17 does not explicitly require proactive monitoring of
user content— indeed, the provision states that it “shall not lead to any general monitoring obligation”— numerous critics have pointed out that it will
nonetheless have the de facto effect of leading to proactive monitoring.169
As German Member of European Parliament Julia Reda has described these
provisions, service providers “will have no choice but to deploy upload filters” to block infringing content.170
Yet, despite strongly encouraging proactive, ex ante screening of usergenerated content, Article 17 gives scant guidance to online content-sharing service providers regarding the technical methodologies of monitoring
user-generated content or blocking infringement. Though it recognizes
that automated, content screening will, by its very nature, broadly affect
free expression, the Copyright Directive places no limitations on its design
or use, instead putting its faith in platforms to develop mechanisms to
review the individual challenges of blocking decisions.171
Rather than challenging the central position of major online platforms
in the digital economy, Article 17 thus reaffirms it. This dynamic is partly
a response to the logic of scale: the experience of Content ID already illustrates that, as platforms develop techniques for policing infringement,
rightsholders demand broader and more extensive applications.172
Allowing platforms to develop technical measures for compliance virtually
ensures that ex ante content moderation minimizes the potential risk of
liability.
Although proponents of Article 17 described the provision as enhancing “platform accountability,” the broad discretion it confers on technology
166. Id. at art. 17. See also The Price of Closing the “Value Gap”, supra note 150, at
357– 58.
167. Copyright Directive 2019/790, supra note 165, at art. 17(4).
168. The Price of Closing the “Value Gap”, supra note 150, at 355– 56.
169. See, e.g., id. at 353 (“the preventive measures demanded in the adopted text cannot realistically be achieved at scale without an [automated content recognition] system
like Content ID.”); Danny O’Brien, EU’s Parliament Signs Off on Disastrous Internet Law:
What Happens Next?, EFF (Mar. 26, 2019), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/03/
eus-parliament-signs-disastrous-internet-law-what-happens-next [https://perma.cc/
BA43-F6SL] (describing the inconsistency between Article 17 and the E-Commerce
Directive).
170. The Text of Article 13 and the EU Copyright Directive Has Just Been Finalized, JULIA
REDA (Feb. 13, 2019), https://juliareda.eu/2019/02/eu-copyright-final-text/ [https://
perma.cc/DG2K-T6SN].
171. Id.
172. See, e.g., The Price of Closing the “Value Gap”, supra note 150, at 108– 11; Helft,
supra note 154.
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companies will, in the long term, serve only to further empower them.173
Indeed, Article 17’s approach exemplifies nearly unbridled deference to
technology for addressing copyright infringement, as well as deference to
the kinds of procedures that platforms believe safeguard due process.174
Advocates of the provisions have deemphasized the significance of these
changes, suggesting that because YouTube already employs Content ID to
filter uploads, the new provisions will just be more of the same.175
Article 17’s safeguards likewise shift the costs of protecting free
expression to individual users.176 Instead of requiring rightsholders to
submit notices of claimed infringement, the Copyright Directive puts the
onus on users to file a “counter-notice” demonstrating that their use of a
copyrighted work falls into an exception or limitation to copyright protection.177 While this mechanism formally pays lip service to the need to
protect free expression, empirical studies have shown that counter-notice
has served as an ineffective check on over-blocking.178
Not only does the Copyright Directive stress the need for expeditious
takedowns, it also emphasizes the need for an “effective complaint and
redress mechanism” in achieving the appropriate balance between free
expression and copyright protection.179 While it encourages platforms to
use automated means to facilitate takedowns, Article 17(9) requires platforms to enact appeal mechanisms subject to “human review” without
“undue delay.” By creating a system in which takedowns are automated,
but appeals are manual, Article 17 ensures that while takedowns occur at
scale, appeals almost certainly cannot.
Although private-sector innovation may address some of the substantive concerns about over-blocking and other burdens on protected expression, the Copyright Directive also raises questions about competition.180
By remaining silent on the design of algorithmic filtering, Article 17 does
not create specific incentives for platforms to innovate in ways that pro173. See., e.g., Madigan, supra note 8 (describing online platforms as “the most powerful and wealthy entities in the world”); Europe Takes an Important Step Toward Platform
Accountability With Directive on Copyright, AAP (Sept. 13, 2018), https://newsroom.publishers.org/europe-takes-an-important-step-toward-platform-accountabilitywith-directive-on-copyright/ [https://perma.cc/SW9D-CYZP].
174. Cf. Madigan, supra note 8.
175. Robert Levine, Mind the Value Gap: Will Europe Address the Legal Loophole That
Lets YouTube Pay Less for Music?, BILLBOARD (Sept. 11, 2018), https://www.billboard.
com/articles/business/8474670/mind-value-gap-europe-address-legal-loophole-lets-you
tube-pay-less-music-column [https://perma.cc/M9NG-FABU].
176. See generally Urban et al., supra note 143.
177. Id. 393– 94, 405.
178. Elkin-Koren, supra note 152, at 1091– 92; Urban et al., supra note 143, at
406– 10.
179. See Copyright Directive 2019/790, supra 165, at 108.
180. See Elkin-Koren, supra note 152, at 1097 (suggesting that improvements to filtering technology might mitigate some of the concerns that proactive screening sweeps too
broadly: as automated copyright enforcement moves toward artificial intelligence and
machine learning, platforms may be able to design systems that are friendlier to fair uses
and that “learn patterns of fair use instances by studying existing fair use decisions”).
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mote fair use.181 Moreover, many of the companies that have already developed proactive filtering and blocking software stand to benefit enormously
from the uptick in new customers. Indeed, the German Data Protection
Commissioner has raised concerns that, because Article 17 all but requires
upload filters, small companies will rely on the filtering technologies of
larger platforms, leading to the emergence of an “oligopoly” of filtering
software.182
B.

Unlawful Speech

Despite the fact that most of the large platforms are now using proactive automated means to filter and block terrorist content on a purportedly
voluntary basis, the availability and widespread positive publicity about
automated, ex ante monitoring and blocking of extremist content has
prompted multiple government actors to enact, or consider, legislation that
would make this technology virtually compulsory. In spring 2019, Australia enacted a law that will impose significant penalties on online service
providers if they fail to rapidly remove “abhorrent violent material” from
their services.183 Under the new statute, providers of online “content services” commit a criminal offense if their services host “abhorrent violent
material” that they fail to “expeditiously” remove.184 The statute does not
define “expeditiously,” but the Australian Attorney General expressed, in a
reading speech, his conviction that platforms could address these concerns
through the use of technology.185 The statute applies regardless of the size
of the company.186
Germany’s new Network Enforcement Act of 2018, colloquially
known as NetzDG, similarly imposes burdens on social media platforms,
and these burdens virtually require the use of upload filters. Under
181. Stan Adams, Why the EU Copyright Directive Is a Threat to Fair Use, CTR. DEMOC& TECH. (Mar. 1, 2019), https://cdt.org/blog/why-the-eu-copyright-directive-is-athreat-to-fair-use/ [https://perma.cc/4LDJ-ACHG].
182. Press Release, Copyright Reform Also Harbors Data Protection Risks, BFDI (Feb.
26, 2019) (available at https://translate.google.com/translate?hl=en&sl=de&u=https://
www.bfdi.bund.de/DE/Infothek/Pressemitteilungen/2019/10_Uploadfilter.html&
prev=search&pto=aue [https://perma.cc/BW9U-V2RD]) [hereinafter BFDI Press
Release] (“Ultimately, such an oligopoly would result in fewer providers of filter technologies, through which more or less all of the internet traffic of relevant platforms and
services runs.”).
183. Damien Cave, Australia Passes Law to Punish Social Media Companies for Violent
Posts, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 3, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/03/world/australia/social-media-law.html [https://perma.cc/5JPH-VL5G].
184. Criminal Code Amendment (Sharing of Abhorrent Violent Material) Act 2019 (Cth)
s 474.34 (Austl.).
185. Evelyn Douek, Australia’s “Abhorrent Violent Material” Law: Shouting “Nerd
Harder” And Drowning Out Speech, 94 AUSTRALIAN L.J. 41 (forthcoming 2020) [hereinafter Australia’s “Abhorrent Violent Material” Law]. See also Daphne Keller, Three Constitutional Thickets: Why Regulating Online Violent Extremism Is Hard, GEORGE WASH.
PROGRAM ON EXTREMISM 1, 3 (2019), https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs
2191/f/Three%20Constitutional%20Thickets.pdf [https://perma.cc/J48E-URDT] [hereinafter Three Constitutional Thickets] (summarizing the current status of several statutes
pushing platforms to take down extreme content more quickly).
186. See Australia’s “Abhorrent Violent Material” Law, supra note 185.
RACY
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NetzDG, platforms must remove certain kinds of “manifestly unlawful”
speech— defined by reference to the German criminal code— within twentyfour hours or face heavy penalties.187 NetzDG applies to social network
providers with two million, or more, registered users in Germany.188
The EU’s draft regulation on preventing the dissemination of terrorist
content online likewise requires platforms to remove or disable access to
“terrorist content” within one hour, or face heavy fines.189 The draft regulation also adopts a relatively broad definition of “terrorist content,” which
includes not only direct incitement but also “glorifying” terrorist crimes or
“depicting the commission” of a terrorist offense.190
Like Article 17, the AVM law, NetzDG, and the EU’s draft terrorism
regulation do not overtly require platforms to adopt proactive screening
methodologies. Nevertheless, their efforts to scale enforcement of the law
push them in that direction. Google’s NetzDG transparency report, for
instance, documents how it uses hashing, fingerprinting, and automated
flagging technologies to try to identify unlawful content more quickly.191
Yet it is particularly difficult to automate compliance with these kinds
of provisions because determining whether speech is unlawful depends on
the context. For instance, NetzDG reaches far more broadly than “terrorist
content” and applies to unlawful content that includes “public incitement
to commit offences” and “disturbing public peace by threatening to commit
offences.”192 The difficulty of conducting complex, fact-dependent analysis of whether material is, in fact, unlawful helps to explain why, as Google
notes, “[m]achine automation simply cannot replace human judgment and
nuance.”193
This difficulty actually prompted the European Parliament to abandon
an earlier effort that required platforms to develop new proactive technologies of automated content moderation, and instead endorse a narrower
approach of requiring “specific” measures short of proactive monitoring.194 Under an earlier version of the draft terrorism regulation, these
measures could include automated removal of content, automated preven187. Evelyn Douek, Germany’s Bold Gambit to Prevent Online Hate Crimes and Fake
News Takes Effect, LAWFARE (Oct. 31, 2017, 11:30 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/
germanys-bold-gambit-prevent-online-hate-crimes-and-fake-news-takes-effect [https://
perma.cc/V9ZU-BRN3].
188. Id. (noting that “registered” users is more inclusive than “active” users).
189. European Parliament Legislative Resolution of 17 April 2019 on the Proposal for a
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Preventing the Dissemination
of Terrorist Content Online, at art. 4(2), COM (2018) P8_TA(2019)0421 (Sept. 4, 2019)
[hereinafter Draft Terrorism Regulation].
190. Id. at art. 2.
191. Removals Under the Network Enforcement Law, GOOGLE, https://transparencyreport.google.com/netzdg/youtube?hl=en [https://perma.cc/SF24-X6ZK] (last visited Feb.
5, 2020) [hereinafter Removals].
192. STRAFGESETZBUCH [StGB] [PENAL CODE], §§ 111, 126, translation at https://
www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stgb/englisch_stgb.html [https://perma.cc/BDU47PGM] (Ger.).
193. Removals, supra note 191.
194. See Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on
Preventing the Dissemination of Terrorist Content Online, at art. 6, COM (2018) 640 final
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tion of re-uploading, or “detecting, identifying and expeditiously removing”
new terrorist content.195 The push toward automation responded directly
to fears that “the longer the content is able to survive online, the more
views it may receive, and the more harm it may cause.”196 Strikingly, the
European Commission had argued that requiring platforms, on pain of liability, to develop technologies to filter and monitor content was still consistent with the E-Commerce Directive’s immunity provision.197
The European Parliament’s version of the draft terrorism regulation is
also more sensitive to the risk that these obligations might tend to entrench
dominant platforms. The regulation instructs that any request for “specific
measures” that platforms ought to take should account for the “technical
feasibility of the measures, the size and economic capacity” of the platform,
and the effects of the measures on free expression and the free flow of
information.198 The draft regulation also makes clear that any penalties,
including fines, should account for the “financial resources” of the platform, whether the platform is a start-up or a small- to medium-sized business, and whether it could comply with a removal order.199
Platforms have generally opposed laws that impose these kinds of
obligations. Facebook vigorously opposed NetzDG, for example, arguing
that the state was “pass[ing] on its own shortcomings and responsibilities
to private companies.”200 Similarly, a consortium of technology companies opposed the Australian AVM measure, arguing that the government
did not consult with the technology sector before drafting the bill.201
Whether required by law or not, however, platforms are in fact committing to develop proactive, automated screening methodologies in
(Sept. 12, 2018) [hereinafter Commission Draft Terrorism Regulation] (calling for proactive monitoring).
195. Id.
196. Commission Staff Working Document Impact Assessment, at 13, SWD (2018) 408
final (Sept. 12, 2018).
197. See Commission Draft Terrorism Regulation, supra note 194, at § 1.2 (“The present
proposal is consistent with the acquis related to the Digital Single Market and in particular the E-Commerce Directive.”).
198. Draft Terrorism Regulation, supra note 189, at art.6. See also Creating a French
Framework to Make Social Media Platforms More Accountable: Acting in France with a
European Vision, CRE 1, 17 (2019), http://thecre.com/RegSM/wp-content/uploads/
2019/05/French-Framework-for-Social-Media-Platforms.pdf [https://perma.cc/V7S7HFJQ] (suggesting a sliding scale of compliance obligations depending on the size of the
operator and its service).
199. Draft Terrorism Regulation, supra note 189, ¶ 38. When this Article was finalized
in April 2020, the draft regulation was undergoing trialogue negotiations. Leaked documents suggested that these Parliamentary changes were not going to be included in the
final text. See EU Online Terrorist Content Legislation Risks Undermining Press Freedom,
CPJ (Mar. 11, 2020, 6:46 AM), https://cpj.org/2020/03/eu-online-terrorist-content-legislation-press-freedom.php [https://perma.cc/D49P-JWF2]. The leaked documents suggested that the final version of the regulation would not require automated filtering. Id.
200. See Jefferson Chase, Facebook Slams Proposed German ‘Anti-Hate Speech’ Social
Media Law, DEUTSCHE WELLE (May 29, 2017), https://www.dw.com/en/facebook-slamsproposed-german-anti-hate-speech-social-media-law/a-39021094 [https://perma.cc/
5JCR-227L].
201. See Cave, supra note 183.
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response to political pressure as well as legislation. In particular, fingerprinting and hash-based screening are also being touted as code-based
solutions to the problems of online hate speech and terrorist speech.202
Nevertheless, as NetzDG illustrates, local laws are prompting platforms to
develop proactive screening methodologies for a host of other types of
illicit content and to invest in expanding ex post moderation capabilities.
C. Defamation
A third context in which regulators have compelled platforms to use
automated means to filter or block online speech occurs in the context of
court judgments ordering online platforms to screen user-generated content for future instances of illegality. In October 2019, the European Court
of Justice (CJEU) issued an opinion partially upholding an injunction that
required Facebook to delete a comment calling Austrian politician Eva
Glawischnig-Pieszek a “corrupt oaf” because it was defamatory under Austrian law.203 At the core of Glawischnig-Pieszek’s case was her request for
an injunction that would compel Facebook to delete any identical or
“equivalent” statements posted by any user worldwide.204 Article 15 of the
E-Commerce Directive precludes EU member states from imposing “general obligations to monitor” the information transmitted or stored by hosting providers.205 In a previous case, SABAM v. Netlog, the CJEU had held
that a Belgian court could not issue an injunction that “requires [a host] to
install a system for filtering” specific types of content “indiscriminately” as
to all of its users.206
Nonetheless, the CJEU concluded that the Austrian court could, consistent with Article 15, order Facebook to remove defamatory material,
identical reposts, and “information, the content of which, whilst essentially
conveying the same message, is worded slightly differently.”207 At the root
202. See, e.g., Sissi Cao, Facebook’s AI Chief Explains How Algorithms Are Policing Content— And Whether It Works, OBSERVER (Dec. 6, 2019, 7:15 AM), https://observer.com/
2019/12/facebook-artificial-intelligence-chief-explain-content-moderation-policy-limitation/ [https://perma.cc/4V29-QHAL] (“And, in addition to that, we have a number of AI
tools that we are developing, like the ones that I had mentioned, that can proactively go
flag the content.”).
203. Case C– 18/18, Glawischnig-Piesczek v. Facebook Ir. Ltd., 2019 E.C.R. ¶ 53. See
also DAPHNE KELLER, DOLPHINS IN THE NET: INTERNET CONTENT FILTERS AND THE ADVOCATE
GENERAL’S GLASWISCHNIG-PIESCZEK V. FACEBOOK IRELAND OPINION 2 (Stanford Ctr. for
Internet & Soc’y 2019).
204. Glawischnig-Piesczek, 2019 E.C.R. ¶ 20.
205. E-Commerce Directive 2000/31, supra note 40, at art. 15. See also Aleksandra
Kuczerawy, To Monitor or Not to Monitor? The Uncertain Future of Article 15 of the ECommerce Directive, BALKINIZATION (May 29, 2019), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2019/
05/to-monitor-or-not-to-monitor-uncertain.html [https://perma.cc/4ACH-B4JM].
206. Case C-360/10, SABAM v. Netlog, 2012 E.C.R. ¶ 26. See also Case C-484/14, Mc
Fadden v. Sony Music Entm’t Ger. GmbH, 2016 E.C.R. ¶ 87; Case C-324/09, L’Oréal v.
eBay, 2011 E.C.R. ¶ 139 (“The measures required of the online service provider concerned cannot consist in an active monitoring of all the data of each of its customers in
order to prevent any future infringement of intellectual property rights via that provider’s website.”).
207. Glawischnig-Piesczek, 2019 E.C.R. ¶ 41.
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of the CJEU ruling is the conviction that Facebook can use “automated
search tools and technologies” to identify new posts of offending material.208 Resting on this assumption, the CJEU held that the injunction was
permissible so long as it identified “specific elements . . . such as . . .
equivalent content to that which was declared to be illegal,” and so long as
Facebook was not required to conduct an “independent assessment” of
whether content was covered or not.209
The opinion neglected to examine several critical aspects of the relief
Glawischnig-Pieszek sought, however. First, algorithmic filtering of defamatory statements is difficult because it requires context: how could automated methods, for instance, tell the difference between a defamatory
comment and a news report on the case?210 As Jennifer Daskal and Kate
Klonick pointed out before the opinion came down, “it’s much more difficult than it sounds to define, let alone reliably identify, an ‘identical’
post.”211 Moreover, the record of automated search tools and technologies
that Facebook has at hand to conduct such monitoring, blocking, and filtering is scant. In particular, the CJEU offered no evidence to support its
impression that the “search tools and technologies” that Facebook has
access to neither required “independent assessment” nor constituted
“indiscriminate” filtering.212
By suggesting that the availability of “automated search tools and technologies” minimized the role Facebook had to play in determining whether
content was within the scope of the injunction, the CJEU expressed—
whether intentionally or not— a latent trust in the capacity of automated
systems to make judgments about content.213 In so doing, the CJEU
seemed to rely on Advocate General Maciej Szpunar’s conclusion that
requiring Facebook to monitor and delete reposting of identical statements
was a proportionate remedy because “seeking and identifying information
identical to that which has been characterized as illegal by a court . . . does
not require sophisticated techniques that might represent an extraordinary
burden.”214 Instead, the Advocate General suggested that “identical” statements could be detected “with the help of software tools.”215
In light of the scant factual record, it is difficult to understand Advocate General Szpunar’s confidence in Facebook’s technology, much less the
208. Id. ¶ 46.
209. Id. ¶ 45.
210. See generally KELLER, supra note 203 (analyzing the potential over inclusiveness
of the approach urged by the Advocate General). Cf. James Vincent, Zuckerberg Criticized over Censorship After Facebook Deletes ‘Napalm Girl’ Photo, VERGE (Sept. 9, 2016,
5:18 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2016/9/9/12859686/facebook-censorshipnapalm-girl-aftenposten [https://perma.cc/6DZW-8JUS].
211. Jennifer Daskal & Kate Klonick, When a Politician Is Called a ‘Lousy Traitor,’
Should Facebook Censor It?, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/06/27/opinion/facebook-censorship-speech-law.html [https://perma.cc/C4A2TQ2W].
212. Glawischnig-Piesczek, 2019 E.C.R. ¶ 46.
213. Id. ¶ 45.
214. Id. ¶ 87 (separate opinion of Advocate General Maciej Szpunar).
215. Id. ¶ 61.
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CJEU’s determination that automated solutions could also discern content
equivalent— but not identical— to defamation.216 But one might speculate
that the widespread publicity about automated content moderation might
seem to support the CJEU’s findings. Ironically, although platforms themselves have “trumpet[ed] the technologies’ capabilities” to avoid regulation,
the CJEU may have had those promises in mind when it found that
Facebook could use software magic to prevent the republication of defamatory content.217
In a sense, the Glawischnig-Piesczek case is nothing new. Courts have
been fighting about the appropriate scope of injunctive relief for defamation for decades.218 Injunctions against online intermediaries are uniquely
effective methods of addressing defamation and other kinds of harmful
speech, which is precisely why intermediary liability protections are so
important.219 In that respect, there have been ongoing debates under
European law about the boundary between appropriate injunctive relief on
the one hand, and the unlawful imposition of a general monitoring obligation on the other.220 In the CJEU’s view, requiring Facebook to monitor
and delete future posts that were identical or equivalent to those judged
defamatory was well within this boundary. However, by tasking Facebook
with using automated methods to detect content equivalent to defamation,
the CJEU is in novel territory. It is easy to imagine how the compliance
technologies Facebook might use could be easily transferred to other contexts or settings.
III.

The Drawbacks of Proactive Moderation

Governments increasingly view automated, content moderation as an
appealing mechanism for solving the full range of “bad content” problems
on social media. Drawing on the apparent success of algorithmic copyright enforcement, automation is now being touted as a solution to the
216. Id. ¶ 73.
217. Internet Platforms, supra note 114, at 7.
218. See, e.g., David S. Ardia, Freedom of Speech, Defamation, and Injunctions, 55 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1, 6 (2013); Steve Tensmeyer, Constitutionalizing Equity: Consequences of
Broadly Interpreting the “Modern Rule” of Injunctions Against Defamation, 72 N.Y.U. ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 43, 44 (2017). See generally Vincent Blasi, Toward a Theory of Prior
Restraint: The Central Linkage, 66 MINN. L. REV. 11 (1981); Erwin Chemerinsky, Injunctions in Defamation Cases, 57 SYRACUSE L. REV. 157 (2007); John Calvin Jeffries, Rethinking Prior Restraint, 92 YALE L.J. 409 (1983).
219. See, e.g., Paul Schiff Berman, Legal Jurisdiction and the Deterritorialization of
Data, 71 VAND. L. REV. 11, 27– 28 (2018) (“Governments have always enacted regulation
through powerful intermediaries.”). See also Hassell v. Bird, 420 P.3d 776, 789– 90 (Cal.
2018); MARTIN HUSOVEC, INJUNCTIONS AGAINST INTERMEDIARIES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION:
ACCOUNTABLE BUT NOT LIABLE? 57 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2017); Eleonora Rosati,
Intermediaries and IP: 5 Key Principles of EU Law, IPKAT (May 21, 2018), http://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2018/05/intermediaries-and-ip-5-key-principles.html [https://
perma.cc/H9UT-7HDJ].
220. KELLER, supra note 203, at 29– 31; Eleonora Rosati, Material, Personal and Geographic Scope of Online Intermediaries’ Removal Obligations Beyond Glawischnig-Piesczek,
C-18/18 and Defamation, EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. (forthcoming), available at https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3438102 [https://perma.cc/NZ26-3TAJ].
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problems of defamation, terrorist content, and other harmful speech
online.221 This Part explores how requiring platforms to deploy automated
means to restrict speech raises substantial concerns about collateral censorship, surveillance, algorithmic control, and private power.222
A.

Content Moderation as Censorship

While early cyber enthusiasts predicted that the Internet would be a
new world free of surveillance and speech regulation, intermediary immunity, in fact, has not eliminated censorship and monitoring, but rather
privatized them.223 Despite being nominally free of liability, platforms
have proven to be vulnerable to what Jack Balkin calls “new-school” methods of speech regulation: “collateral censorship,” “public-private cooperation and cooptation,” and “digital prior restraint.”224 When states coerce
platforms to cooperate in censorship and surveillance, they play into the
central dynamic that characterizes the uneasy relationship amongst users
that depend on platforms for effective communication, platforms that
depend on governments for a favorable regulatory environment, and governments that depend on platforms to carry out vital law enforcement
tasks.225
Ex ante, automated content moderation aptly illustrates this dynamic.
Calls to extend ex ante, automated content moderation to particular types
or categories of speech create the risk of collateral censorship and digital
prior restraint by threatening to hold platforms liable unless they censor
speech at the government’s bidding.226 Moreover, the companies that control the “infrastructure of free expression” provide only weak protections
when a government “uses that infrastructure, or its limitations, as leverage
for regulation or surveillance.”227
As it stands, automated content moderation already demonstrates the
risk that technical “solutions” designed to prevent bad content from spreading will have collateral effects on lawful expression. One recent, quantitative analysis of a random sample of over 1,800 DMCA takedown requests,
found that a significant number of requests either, incorrectly identified, or
insufficiently specified, the allegedly infringing work.228 Despite these
221. See discussion supra Part II.
222. Portions of this Part draw on my previous article, see generally Bloch-Wehba,
supra note 21.
223. Free Speech Is a Triangle, supra note 10, at 2011– 15; Old-School/New-School
Speech Regulation, supra note 12, at 2298– 99. See also Derek E. Bambauer, Against
Jawboning, 100 MINN. L. REV. 51, 57– 58 (2015) [hereinafter Against Jawboning]; Seth F.
Kreimer, Censorship by Proxy: The First Amendment, Internet Intermediaries, and the
Problem of the Weakest Link, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 11, 11 (2006).
224. Free Speech Is a Triangle, supra note 10, at 2011.
225. Id. at 2020, 2035, 2047.
226. Id. at 2018– 19 (“Imposing liability on infrastructure providers unless they surveil and block speech, or remove speech that others complain about, has many features
of a prior restraint, although technically it is not identical to a classic prior restraint.”).
227. Old-School/New-School Speech Regulation, supra note 12, at 2303.
228. URBAN ET AL., NOTICE AND TAKEDOWN IN EVERYDAY PRACTICE 2 (2d ed. 2017). See
also Daphne Keller, Empirical Evidence of “Over-Removal” by Internet Companies Under
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insufficiencies, material that is alleged to infringe a claimant’s copyright is
routinely “removed before the target [of a takedown request] is given the
opportunity to respond.”229 Users who are targeted by a wrongful takedown request rarely send counter-notices, and the “unbalanced liability
standards” of copyright make it legally risky for platforms to encourage
their users to send counter-notices.230 The result is a regime in which the
technical and legal infrastructure for DMCA compliance appears to have
come at a significant cost to users’ interests in free expression.
These trade-offs are not, of course, unique to copyright enforcement.
Take, for example, the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism’s hashsharing database. The chief virtue of the hash database is its efficiency:
because the database is shared across platforms, it prevents users from
effectively re-uploading videos and images that have already been identified
as violent.231 But this efficiency comes at a substantial cost to free expression. Like automated copyright enforcement, the hash database for violent
extremist and terrorist content is “context-blind”— as Daphne Keller has
put it, “an ISIS video looks the same, whether used in recruiting or in news
reporting.”232 The result is that the hash database may have a disproportionately negative effect on news organizations, human rights defenders,
and dissidents who seek to expose and comment on violence.233
Platforms’ efforts to proactively monitor and block user expression
raise three particular concerns about collateral censorship. First, as a matter of substance, efforts to exclude certain categories of expression from
public discourse are likely to target marginalized perspectives and underrepresented communities.234 Nowhere is this more evident than in efforts
to define “terrorist” and “extremist” speech. When governments pressure
platforms to more aggressively address terrorist or extremist content
online, they often reflect the teachings of years of Islamophobic security
policy. As Amna Akbar has documented, the “discursive construct” of
“radicalization” has irrevocably shaped government’s identification of the
“terrorist threat.”235 As a result, many mundane aspects of daily life in
Muslim communities are understood by law enforcement as potentially significant indicators of “radicalism.”236 In turn, the technological infrastrucIntermediary Liability Laws, STAN. CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y (Oct. 12, 2015), http://
cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2015/10/empirical-evidence-over-removal-internet-compan
ies-under-intermediary-liability-laws [https://perma.cc/383C-6VAH] (summarizing several studies).
229. URBAN ET AL., supra note 228, at 118.
230. Id.
231. GIFCT Transparency Report, GIFCT, https://www.gifct.org/transparency/
[https://perma.cc/S7L4-5KE4] (last visited July 7, 2020).
232. Internet Platforms, supra note 114, at 7.
233. Land, supra note 10, at 7, 60– 61.
234. See Sap et al., supra note 96, at 1668 (reviewing Perspective API’s disproportionate flagging of African-American English speech as “toxic” and “rude”).
235. Amna Akbar, Policing “Radicalization”, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 809, 816 (2013).
236. Id. at 827. See also Amna Akbar, National Security’s Broken Windows, 62 UCLA
L. REV. 834, 834 (2015); Sahar F. Aziz, Losing the “War of Ideas:” A Critique of Counter
Violent Extremism Programs, 52 TEX. INT’L L.J. 255, 257– 58 (2017).
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tures that platforms then build, reflect government’s security priorities.
Therefore, systems of automated content moderation build on social and
political constructions of the terrorist threat— but which constructions, and
at whose expense?
Consider, for example, platforms’ inconsistent approaches to the problem of white nationalism, Nazism, and right-wing terrorism on the one
hand, and to ISIS and al-Qaeda on the other. Though major platforms took
steps after Christchurch to eliminate white nationalism and separatism
from their services, it appears that they still struggle with the issue. An
ongoing civil rights audit of Facebook points out that the company’s ban
extends only to content that explicitly uses the terms “white nationalism”
or “white separatism,” and thus “leaves up content that expressly espouses
white nationalist ideology” without using these keywords.237 In August
2019, the Anti-Defamation League published a list of white nationalist
groups still active on YouTube after it famously “purged” them.238 YouTube responded by removing some of the channels highlighted in the
report, but many were able to restore access to the platform.239
These examples highlight the possibility that platforms are applying
their own content moderation rules in ways that are, if not outright discriminatory, at the very least, underinclusive. Moreover, platforms highlighted the “effectiveness” of their filtering and blocking techniques as a
signal to European and American legislators that they took the threat of
Islamic terrorism seriously.240 But only after Christchurch, as political
pressure to address white nationalist terrorism ramped up, did online platforms begin to actually take this threat seriously. Even now, Facebook’s
ongoing public relations campaign to counter accusations that the platform discriminates against conservative viewpoints undermines its efforts
to address white nationalism.241
Second, as a matter of process, platforms and governments are also
willing to tolerate higher error costs for speech that is identified as a prior237. Facebook’s Civil Rights Audit— Progress Report, FACEBOOK 1, 9 (2019), https://
about.fb.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/civilrightaudit_final.pdf [https://
perma.cc/T8A5-QUX2] [hereinafter Facebook’s Civil Rights Audit].
238. Despite YouTube Policy Update, Anti-Semitic, White Supremacist Channels Remain,
ADL (Aug. 15, 2019), https://www.adl.org/blog/despite-youtube-policy-update-antisemitic-white-supremacist-channels-remain [https://perma.cc/82SV-J9RN].
239. Id. See also Alex Kaplan, YouTube Removed Some Channels Affiliated with White
Nationalism— But Not All, MEDIA MATTERS (Aug. 28, 2019, 2:26 PM), https://
www.mediamatters.org/white-nationalism/youtube-removed-some-channels-affiliatedwhite-nationalism-not-all [https://perma.cc/T64E-82KU].
240. See Bloch-Wehba, supra note 21, at 44– 45 (documenting how EU policy evolved
in response to a series of ISIS attacks in France).
241. See Charlie Warzel, Why Will Breitbart Be Included in ‘Facebook News’?, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/25/opinion/mark-zuckerberg-facebook.html [https://perma.cc/BK73-6XZL]; Jason Wilson, Leaked Emails
Reveal Trump Aide Stephen Miller’s White Nationalist Views, GUARDIAN (Nov. 14, 2019,
2:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/nov/14/stephen-miller-leakedemails-white-nationalism-trump [https://perma.cc/CW8K-FKS4].
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ity for removal.242 For instance, YouTube’s recent “purge” of videos supporting white supremacy and white nationalism also swept up videos that
documented, reported on, and aimed to counteract those ideologies.243
Experience has shown that systems designed to block certain kinds of
speech are likely to be overinclusive— hardly a novel observation.244 In
theory, overinclusiveness is a design flaw that can be overcome by technological innovation.245 But accepting high error rates within systems
designed to monitor, block, filter, and monetize user expression is a political decision. In practice, the incentives for platforms to take “bad content”
down always seem to outweigh the incentives to design systems with minimal error rates or maximal accommodations for free speech.246 These
political pressures influence informational filters, although they are rarely
accounted for by designers. Indeed, as companies find themselves scrutinized from all sides, political and social pressure will likely inform speech
decisions as much as, or more than, technology alone.
Third, the new wave of Internet regulation and the emergence of “voluntary” filtering illustrates the risk that governments will informally pressure platforms to adopt limitations on speech (what Derek Bambauer has
called “jawboning”).247 When governments do this through political
means— for example, through formal regulation or legislation— that political act is formally accountable to the public. But when governments pressure platforms to use their private authority to take down certain types of
speech— for example, because it violates their terms of service— they tend
to do so in ways that are less visible and less accountable to the public.248

242. Cf. Internet Platforms, supra note 114, at 7 (arguing that platforms with less
money to invest in content recognition software “will, if forced to build filters, presumably be forced to tolerate high rates of false positives in order to avoid liability for false
negatives”).
243. Kyle Daly, YouTube to Ban Supremacist Content, Purge Videos, POLITICO (June 5,
2019, 2:41 PM), https://politi.co/2HX3Jf2 [https://perma.cc/2RXZ-V739]; Kelly Weill,
YouTube Crackdown on Extremism Also Deleted Videos Combating Extremism, DAILY BEAST
(June 6, 2019, 3:20 PM), https://www.thedailybeast.com/youtube-crackdown-onextremism-also-deleted-videos-combating-extremism [https://perma.cc/5CCA-78B7].
244. See, e.g., Duarte et al., supra note 97, at 6. See also EVAN ENGSTROM & NICK FEAMSTER, THE LIMITS OF FILTERING: A LOOK AT THE FUNCTIONALITY & SHORTCOMINGS OF CONTENT DETECTION TOOLS 19 (2017); J.M. Balkin, Comment, Media Filters, the V-Chip, and
the Foundations of Broadcast Regulation, 45 DUKE L.J. 1131, 1133 (1996) [hereinafter
Media Filters]; Derek Bambauer, Cybersieves, 59 DUKE L.J. 377, 397 (2009) [hereinafter
Cybersieves]; Internet Platforms, supra note 114, at 6 (describing errors in automated
generation of DMCA takedown requests, and noting that systems for processing those
requests sometimes, but not always, catch errors); Land, supra note 10, at 8.
245. Elkin-Koren, supra note 152, at 1097; Media Filters, supra note 244, at 1153– 54
(noting that two chief arguments against the V-Chip— that “parents will be unable to use
[it] . . . [and that] children will be able to break through. . . .”— are really a “problem of
technological design”).
246. See, e.g., Bloch-Wehba, supra note 21, at 79 (describing the “lopsided incentives”
to remove online content).
247. Against Jawboning, supra note 223, at 57.
248. Chang, supra note 132, at 120– 22; Land, supra note 10, at 15.
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Content Moderation as Surveillance

Automated content moderation also opens up new avenues for surveillance and monitoring of users as individuals and as groups.249 In this
respect, hash- or fingerprint-based technologies like Content ID and the
GIFCT hash database are particularly troubling. The GIFCT hash database
offers a ripe, new way for platforms to identify, cross-reference, and keep
tabs on accounts that have posted terrorist content in the past. Platforms
have claimed that the database includes around 100,000 hashed
images.250 Yet, it is unclear whether, and under what circumstances, those
images are shared with law enforcement.
The hash database has significant potential as a counterterrorist tool
far beyond taking down terrorist content. Just as Content ID permits rightsholders to opt to monitor viewing activity on infringing videos, law
enforcement might opt to monitor engagement with terrorist posts on
social media in order to map associations and networks of suspected sympathizers, to understand the diffusion of propaganda, or simply to monitor
those who have viewed dangerous online content.251 Indeed, some have
raised concerns that systematically deleting terrorist content from major
platforms will drive terrorist networks underground, thereby depriving
government of a critical source of information.252
Even apart from direct information sharing between GIFCT and the
government, automated mechanisms illustrate how closely connected
speech rights and surveillance are. To understand how private, automated
moderation mechanisms might play into existing law enforcement paradigms, imagine that YouTube’s algorithm for screening extremist content
prevents a user from uploading a television segment reporting on the Kurdistan Worker’s Party, or the PKK. Now imagine that a law enforcement
249. See, e.g., Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due Process: Toward a
Framework to Redress Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93, 94– 95 (2014). The
use of machine learning for algorithmic content moderation also has more concrete privacy harms beyond the context of law enforcement surveillance. For example, to the
extent that platforms use machine learning methods which learn from user-generated
content without the consent or knowledge of the users themselves, it might have significant privacy implications. Id.
250. Larry Greenemeier, Social Media’s Stepped-Up Crackdown on Terrorists Still Falls
Short, SCI. AM. (July 24, 2018), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/socialmedias-stepped-up-crackdown-on-terrorists-still-falls-short/ [https://perma.cc/UEK4XJUG].
251. See, e.g., Hannah Bloch-Wehba, Process Without Procedure: National Security Letters and First Amendment Rights, 49 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 367, 381 (2016) (illustrating how
national security letters are used to find associations and networks of individuals and
groups).
252. See, e.g., Bateman, supra note 25. Strikingly, the American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU) made a similar argument in defense of its decision to represent white nationalist
protestors in advance of the Charlottesville “Unite the Right” rally in 2017. See Anthony
D. Romero, Equality, Justice and the First Amendment, ACLU (Aug. 15, 2017, 6:00 PM),
https://www.aclu.org/blog/free-speech/equality-justice-and-first-amendment [https://
perma.cc/HU3L-CVKR] (“Racism and bigotry will not be eradicated if we merely force
them underground.”). See also P.E. MOSKOWITZ, THE CASE AGAINST FREE SPEECH: THE FIRST
AMENDMENT, FASCISM, AND THE FUTURE 18 (Bold Type Books 1st ed. 2019).
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agency subpoenas YouTube for subscriber information pertaining to all
users who have attempted to upload prohibited “terrorist” videos, among
which our user is one.
In several respects, this hypothetical illustrates how content moderation rules— and the technical infrastructures that enforce them— might
open new kinds of behavior and new actors to scrutiny that was previously
beyond the state’s capabilities. While a platform might use a human content moderator to determine whether the uploaded content should be permitted or forbidden, law enforcement uses its investigative tools to
determine whether the poster has committed a crime. When law enforcement demands a list of all those users whose uploads were captured by an
automated filter, it does not distinguish between them.253
The result is that, in complying with this demand, YouTube is providing law enforcement with subscriber information for a fairly broad set of
users whose only suspicious act was running afoul of an algorithm. The
platforms’ efforts to account for context in determining whether a usergenerated post is permitted or forbidden are irrelevant to law enforcement.254 In addition, YouTube’s moderation practices make available
information about a broader set of actors. The harmful act that once
would have prompted law enforcement to monitor or surveil the user’s
behavior— the actual dissemination of “terrorist content”— has been
replaced by the unsuccessful attempt to distribute unlawful content.255
Regardless of the fact that the attempt might, itself, be unlawful as a matter
of substantive criminal law, we might question whether these attempts to
distribute unlawful content are, by definition, sufficiently grave to warrant
law enforcement action.256
In a sense, the platforms’ ability to cheaply and easily generate a broad
array of information relevant to law enforcement is simply an illustration
of the extent to which private sector surveillance underpins law enforcement investigations.257 The platforms’ ability— and, indeed, obligation— to
generate this information is a classic example of a transformation in technology and society that expands police power by lowering the cost of sur253. See, e.g., Facebook’s Civil Rights Audit, supra note 237, at 10 (noting a variety of
pilot efforts to better train human reviewers).
254. For example, while YouTube tries to differentiate between videos that “discuss
topics like pending legislation, aim to condemn or expose hate, or provide analysis of
current events,” its automated filters are not fully capable of doing so. See Our Ongoing
Work to Tackle Hate, supra note 126.
255. Cf. Heidi R. Gilchrist, The Vast Gulf Between Attempted Mass Shooting &
Attempted Material Support, 81 U. PITT. L. REV. 63, 84– 93 (2019).
256. See Shirin Sinnar, Separate and Unequal: The Law of “Domestic” and “International” Terrorism, 117 MICH. L. REV. 1333, 1393 (2019) (noting that many attempted
materials to support prosecutions “make[ ] little effort to distinguish between individuals with and without a plausible connection to grave international threats”).
257. See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018) (reasoning
that warrantless access to cell site location records in the possession of third-party cell
phone companies contravenes societal expectations that police will not “secretly monitor and catalogue every single movement” individuals make).
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veillance and expanding the ability to surveil in the first place.258 These
shifts call into question the preexisting balance of power between the government and the public.259
But platform surveillance also creates new opportunities for law
enforcement precisely because these kinds of mechanisms are not as readily observed— or evaded— as their physical equivalents. To the extent that
the new breed of content regulation constrains content moderation practices, it makes platforms a more attractive source for law enforcement seeking to obtain information about users. Regardless of whether automated
moderation techniques are required by law or simply adopted voluntarily,
they increase the wealth of information available about users— their relationships, their interests, and their engagement with online content (all of
which platforms already collect)— and that is highly relevant for law
enforcement investigations. Moreover, because most of these decisions
occur behind closed doors, platform surveillance tends to operate in ways
that are not amenable to public oversight or control.260
C.

Content Moderation as Algorithmic Control

The shift toward automation in content moderation also underscores
longstanding concerns about bias, fairness, transparency, and accountability in machine learning and in automated systems more generally.261 As
the private and public sectors increasingly rely on automation in ways that
entrench power dynamics and impact individual rights and liberties, these
concerns have come to the forefront of scholarship and public
discourse.262
One concern regards widespread overconfidence in technology itself
as a mechanism for solving social and political problems. Magical thinking
about artificial intelligence (AI) is prevalent, even though few can even
258. See Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment,
125 HARV. L. REV. 476, 500 (2011).
259. Id.
260. Cf. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415– 16 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“[B]ecause GPS monitoring is cheap in comparison to conventional surveillance
techniques and, by design, proceeds surreptitiously, it evades the ordinary checks that
constrain abusive law enforcement practices: ‘limited police resources and community
hostility.’ ”) (quoting Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 426 (2004)).
261. See, e.g., Jenna Burrell, How the Machine ‘Thinks’: Understanding Opacity in
Machine Learning Algorithms, BIG DATA & SOC’Y, Jan.– June 2016, at 1, 4; Paul B. de Laat,
Big Data and Algorithmic Decision-Making: Can Transparency Restore Accountability?,
ACM COMPUTERS & SOC’Y, Sept. 2017, at 39, 45– 46; Sonia K. Katyal, Private Accountability in the Age of Artificial Intelligence, 66 UCLA L. REV. 54, 56 (2019); Joshua A. Kroll et
al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 680 (2017); Fairness, Accountability,
and Transparency in Machine Learning, FAT/ML, https://www.fatml.org [https://perma
.cc/249S-ACSC] (last visited Feb. 4, 2020).
262. See, e.g., Ifeoma Ajunwa et al., Limitless Worker Surveillance, 105 CALIF. L. REV.
735, 753 (2017); Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104
CALIF. L. REV. 671, 674 (2016); Ryan Calo & Alex Rosenblat, The Taking Economy: Uber,
Information, and Power, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1623, 1627 (2017); Pauline T. Kim, DataDriven Discrimination at Work, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 857, 863 (2017).
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agree on what AI is.263 Policymakers are not immune to techno-optimism,
but have proven vulnerable to its fallacies, embracing innovation by adopting risky technology in settings like healthcare, welfare, education, and
criminal justice while failing to regulate AI in any meaningful way.264 In
this regard, AI policy presents a particularly potent example of Edward
Felten’s Third Law: “lawyers put too much faith in technical solutions,
while technologists put too much faith in legal solutions.”265
But overconfidence in technical solutions can have damaging effects.
Far from serving as a neutral arbiter, the algorithms that Internet
intermediaries use to rank and prioritize content often reflect and encode
social bias.266 While publicly available displays, such as auto-complete
suggestions or search results, can be interpreted as indications of
algorithmic bias, other algorithms operate in ways that are more immune
from scrutiny.267 As private platforms determine and control the conditions under which researchers might access the information needed to
study algorithmic bias in the first instance, they reinforce their own ability
to control political and public narratives regarding algorithmic
accountability.268
The opacity of content moderation rules, algorithms, and decisions
also alters the ways that online users perceive and experience online partic263. See, e.g., Ryan Calo, Artificial Intelligence Policy: A Primer and Roadmap, 51 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 399, 406– 07 (2017) (describing varying, potential definitions for artificial
intelligence); Arvind Narayanan, How to Recognize AI Snake Oil, PRINCETON U. 1, 6
(2019), https://www.cs.princeton.edu/~arvindn/talks/MIT-STS-AI-snakeoil.pdf [https:/
/perma.cc/AME7-TM3P] (“Companies advertising AI as the solution to all problems
have been helped along by credulous media.”).
264. See, e.g., PASQUALE, supra note 22, at 61; Barocas & Selbst, supra note 262, at
671; Technological Due Process, supra note 11, at 1249; Mayson, supra note 11, at 2218;
Rebecca Wexler, Life, Liberty, and Trade Secrets: Intellectual Property in the Criminal Justice System, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1346 (2018).
265. Paul Ohm, Breaking Felten’s Third Law: How Not to Fix the Internet, 87 DENVER U.
L. REV. ONLINE 50, 50 (2010) (quoting Edward Felten).
266. See, e.g., SAFIYA UMOJA NOBLE, ALGORITHMS OF OPPRESSION: HOW SEARCH ENGINES
REINFORCE RACISM 2 (N.Y. Univ. Press 2018); Katyal, supra note 261, at 94 (arguing that
stereotypes in search results might create a social feedback loop).
267. For example, some Facebook users have reported a frustrating, Kafkaesque
experience of having their accounts disabled for “suspicious activity” without recourse.
Kashmir Hill, Many Are Abandoning Facebook. These People Have the Opposite Problem,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/22/business/reactivatefacebook-account.html [https://perma.cc/VRC7-MNYD].
268. Facebook’s foundering partnership with Social Science One is a key example of
this dynamic. See, e.g., Alex Pasternack, Frustrated Funders Exit Facebook’s Election
Transparency Project, FAST COMPANY (Oct. 28, 2019), https://www.fastcompany.com/
90412518/facebooks-plan-for-radical-transparency-was-too-radical [https://perma.cc/
E765-TWTX]; Craig Silverman, Exclusive: Funders Have Given Facebook a Deadline to
Share Data with Researchers or They’re Pulling Out, BUZZFEED NEWS (Aug. 27, 2019, 4:53
PM), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/craigsilverman/funders-are-ready-to-pullout-of-facebooks-academic-data [https://perma.cc/3HUD-279C]; Gillian Tett, Why
Facebook’s Data-Sharing Initiative Is Faltering, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2019), https://www
.ft.com/content/98b5385e-0025-11ea-b7bc-f3fa4e77dd47 [https://perma.cc/CA9XYU36].
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ipation.269 On the one hand, the apparent arbitrariness of moderation
decisions— and of algorithmic moderation in particular— might heighten
the need for transparency in order to promote legitimacy. In response to
shadowy decisions about user-generated content, users have developed
what Sarah Myers West has charitably called “folk theories” regarding
moderation.270 More transparency might promote user trust in the system,
but it depends on how meaningful the disclosures are.271 On the other
hand, meaningful transparency for ex ante, automated moderation techniques would also undermine their effectiveness, likely resulting in more
ex post screening. If transparency enabled users to “reverse engineer” moderation standards, it may result in users developing a novel, new vocabulary to evade moderation— entrenching unwanted content while making it
more difficult to detect.272
Policymakers’ faith in the power of private innovation is perhaps most
visible in contexts such as statutes that require technology companies to
invest heavily in new, untested technologies of moderation, or court rulings that assume platforms have technical capabilities not in evidence.273
But when it comes to content moderation, much of this faith is misplaced.
For example, in the aftermath of the Christchurch shooting, YouTube and
Facebook users altered the footage slightly— for example, by surrounding it
in a frame, or by posting video of the footage streaming in a second window— in order to get the footage past automated detection mechanisms.274
These incidents illustrated how automated content moderation systems
struggle to draw lines between protected and illicit content.
These failures prompted widespread outrage, but addressing the problem using mechanical solutions would require greater efforts to suppress
users’ posts. Moreover, broader approaches to preventing the dissemination of unlawful content might result in platforms suppressing newsworthy
posts in addition to “gratuitous graphic violence.”275 For content that
inherently lacks any redeeming social value, such as child pornography or
non-consensual pornography, the need to prevent harm might justify the
269. See J. Nathan Matias, The Civic Labor of Volunteer Moderators Online, SOC. MEDIA
& SOC’Y, Apr.– June 2019, at 1, 4– 5; Nicolas P. Suzor et al., What Do We Mean When We
Talk About Transparency? Toward Meaningful Transparency in Commercial Content Moderation, 13 INT’L J. COMM. 1526, 1527 (2019) [hereinafter What Do We Mean When We Talk
About Transparency?]; Censored, Suspended, Shadowbanned, supra note 52, at 4366; Sarah
Myers West, Raging Against the Machine: Network Gatekeeping and Collective Action on
Social Media Platforms, MEDIA & COMM., Sept. 2017, at 28, 28.
270. Censored, Suspended, Shadowbanned, supra note 52, at 4372– 74.
271. Suzor et al., supra note 269, at 1527.
272. See Chancellor et al., supra note 98, at 1201 (explaining how pro-eating disorder
communities on Instagram adopted unusual spellings to circumvent hashtag moderation techniques).
273. See supra Part II.
274. Issie Lapowsky, Why Tech Didn’t Stop the New Zealand Attack from Going Viral,
WIRED (Mar. 15, 2019, 1:50 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/new-zealand-shootingvideo-social-media [https://perma.cc/VE3L-MMV5].
275. Id.
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cost to free expression.276 But in other contexts, such as defamation, hate
speech, or terrorist propaganda, whether content is unlawful “depends on
the overall context, including the message and precise wording.”277
The challenge of designing automated systems to identify and suppress certain kinds of content highlights the more straightforward political
difficulty of defining unlawful content in the first instance. Even if platforms could automate the detection of terrorist propaganda, extremist content, or hate speech, defining those categories will be as difficult as
identifying parody, fake news, or fair use.278 This inquiry is fact-bound
and culturally specific. With respect to all but the clearest cases, policymakers and platforms will find it difficult to apply these distinctions and
determine the social value of user-generated content. That this is a fundamental problem of free expression explains why automated decision-making alone cannot answer the challenge.
Of course, forcing humans to decide whether horrific content ought to
be permitted or taken down creates its own problems. Content moderators
often work in “sweatshop-like” conditions to clean up the Internet.279 Content moderators often experience serious trauma from viewing so many
disturbing posts and images in quick succession.280 Some of them come
to believe conspiracy theories expressed in moderated content.281 And
contractors sometimes discourage moderators from raising questions to
Facebook about unclear subjects, perpetuating the lack of clarity and
apparent arbitrariness of some of these rules.282
The human cost of content moderation will amplify calls for automated moderation techniques. Facebook and other platforms play into
this narrative, arguing that artificial intelligence can help platforms solve
their content-related problems.283 But the platform may not be able to
avoid using human content moderators. For example, under the General
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), individuals “have the right not to be
subject to a decision based solely on automated processing . . . which produces legal effects concerning him or her or similarly significantly affects
276. Danielle Citron & Quinta Jurecic, Platform Justice 11– 12 (Hoover Inst. Aegis
Series Paper No. 1811, 2018).
277. Id. at 13.
278. The Platform Is the Message, supra note 31, at 15 (“[I]dentifying and excluding
fake news is a hard line-drawing problem.”).
279. See Hanna Kozlowska, This Documentary Shows the Sweatshop-Like Labor of
Internet Content Moderators, QUARTZ (Nov. 12, 2018), https://qz.com/1460906/thecleaners-is-a-documentary-that-shows-the-sweatshop-like-labor-of-content-moderators/
[https://perma.cc/XC56-AZ6F].
280. Casey Newton, The Trauma Floor: The Secret Lives of Facebook Moderators in
America, VERGE (Feb. 25, 2019, 8:00 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2019/2/25/1822
9714/cognizant-facebook-content-moderator-interviews-trauma-working-conditions-arizona [https://perma.cc/W6K3-ZD3J].
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. James Vincent, AI Won’t Relieve the Misery of Facebook’s Human Moderators,
VERGE (Feb. 27, 2019, 12:41 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2019/2/27/18242724/
facebook-moderation-ai-artificial-intelligence-platforms [https://perma.cc/6EXK-D4H8].
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him or her.”284 Even those who are most optimistic about the use of artificial intelligence to detect harmful online content acknowledge the vital role
that human moderators play in deciding whether user-generated posts
ought to remain online or be taken down.285
D.

Content Moderation as Power

Finally, automation mandates may entrench the position of firms at
the leading edge of AI development, such as Facebook and Google. In a
climate of increasing sensitivity to technology platforms’ market dominance, content regulation has proven attractive for opponents of “Big
Tech.”286 However, some have argued that automation requirements are as
burdensome as to exclude new start-ups and smaller competitors.287
Moreover, as the developers of AI moderation tools, technology platforms
such as Google, Facebook, and Twitter, and companies such as Crisp,
Twohat, and Adobe stand to gain substantially from the expansion of automation mandates.288
A full assessment of how content regulation might reshape competition is beyond the scope of this Article. But the experience of algorithmic,
copyright enforcement confirms that commercial interests provide powerful motives for platforms to monetize their moderation systems by selling
their services to competitors.289 As Bridy documented, Audible Magic—
one of the chief purveyors of copyright filtering technology— lobbied the
European Commission to require proactive filtering in Article 17.290
284. Council Regulation 2016/679, of the European Parliament and of the Council of
27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of
Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/
EC, art. 22, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 15, 65 (EU) [hereinafter GDPR].
285. Telephone Interview with Mark Zuckerberg, CEO, Facebook, Inc. (Apr. 2, 2019),
available at https://www.fool.com/earnings/call-transcripts/2019/04/25/facebook-incfb-q1-2019-earnings-call-transcript.aspx [https://perma.cc/ZR42-YYTT] (“The only
hope is building AI systems that can either identify things and handle them proactively
or at the very least, flag them for a lot of people who work for us who can then look at
them.”).
286. Tim Mak, Senator Pushes Bill to Curb ‘Exploitative and Addictive’ Social Media
Practices, NPR (Aug. 14, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/08/14/
750585438/senator-pushes-bill-to-curb-exploitative-and-addictive-social-media-practices
[https://perma.cc/S8HQ-E8AG].
287. See James Temperton & Matt Reynolds, The European Parliament Has Voted in
Favour of Article 13, WIRED (Mar. 26, 2019), https://www.wired.co.uk/article/eu-article13-vote-article-17 [https://perma.cc/8MER-6MSF].
288. One major content moderation contractor, Cognizant, announced in fall 2019
that it would exit the content moderation business, while allocating $5 million to
research on automation and algorithmic moderation. Telephone Interview with Brian
Humphries, CEO, Cognizant Technology Solutions Corp. (Oct. 30, 2019), available at
https://www.fool.com/earnings/call-transcripts/2019/10/31/cognizant-technologysolutions-corp-ctsh-q3-2019-e.aspx [https://perma.cc/M6S6-9LE3].
289. See, e.g., BFDI Press Release, supra note 182 (raising concerns that large platforms will sell their moderation systems to small platforms, cementing their
dominance).
290. See Annemarie Bridy (@AnnemarieBridy), TWITTER (Jan. 19, 2019, 6:06 PM),
https://twitter.com/AnnemarieBridy/status/1086761804301094917 (citing a promo-
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Already, companies such as Adobe291 and Crisp292 are selling proprietary
filtering software that purports to effectively filter hate speech and terrorist
content. Proactive monitoring requirements will create a vast, new market
for automated moderation techniques. These market effects will be present
regardless of whether new regulations require the use of ex ante screening
methodologies, or simply encourage them.
E.

Content Moderation as Extraterritorial Governance

Pushing platforms to adopt automated, ex ante screening methodologies is a matter of global significance. These changes send a signal to other
governments— and to lobbyists— that domestic law can effectively require
online service providers to be more proactive in filtering and monitoring
content.293 As platforms build and acquire the technological infrastructures necessary to comply with European law, they are likely to use those
infrastructures on a global scale, not only in their European affiliates.294
Local content regulations have global effects in part because platforms
prefer to enforce their terms of service before enforcing local law.295 As
platforms increasingly automate the screening of user-generated content
for compliance with their terms of service, content that violates community
guidelines will be taken down globally.296 The global effects of takedowns
combine with the problems of over-deletion. For instance, when service
providers receive DMCA notices, they generally delete the content across
the entire platform, rather than by blocking or filtering content within the
U.S.297
tional video regarding “content recognition technologies” in Article 17— previously
referred to as Article 13).
291. See, e.g., Content Management Meets AI with Adobe Experience Manager Sites,
ADOBE, https://www.adobe.com/marketing-cloud/experience-manager/social-mediamoderation.html [https://perma.cc/SX4T-77US] (last visited Apr. 16, 2020).
292. See, e.g., Crisp Solutions: Digital Marketing Defense, CRISP THINKING, https://
www.crispthinking.com/content-moderation-for-social-networks [https://perma.cc/
DY3G-GR4D] (last visited Apr. 16, 2020).
293. See, e.g., Anu Bradford, The Brussels Effect, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 44 (2012)
(citing Katerina Linos’s work on legal diffusion). Indeed, organizations that represent
rightsholders have already urged the United States Copyright Office to consider filtering
and fingerprinting technologies as “standard technical measures” that should be
required in order for companies to benefit from Section 512’s safe harbor. See also, e.g.,
Copyright Office of the United States of America, Comment Letter on Section 512
Study: Notice and Request for Public Comment, submitted by Jay Rosenthal & Steven
Metalitz (Apr. 1, 2016), http://static.politico.com/a3/bf/686b5f2942dbb2b5327a8a
2d8ceb/music-community-submission-in-re-dmca-512-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/FXZ9NDWV].
294. See Bloch-Wehba, supra note 21, at 29 (describing how platform terms of service
generally apply globally, not locally).
295. See, e.g., Amélie Heldt, Reading Between the Lines and the Numbers: An Analysis of
the First NetzDG Reports, INTERNET POL’Y REV., June 2019, at 1, 11 (documenting how
platforms enforcing Germany’s NetzDG law tend to screen content against their community guidelines before assessing compliance with local law).
296. See also Extremist Speech, supra note 10, at 1055– 57.
297. Annemarie Bridy, Intellectual Property, in LAW, BORDERS, AND SPEECH: PROCEEDINGS AND MATERIALS 13 (Daphne Keller ed., Stanford Ctr. for Internet & Soc’y 2017),
available at https://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/files/publication/files/12-18%20FINAL%20
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These practices raise potent questions about the implications of new
content regulations for jurisdictions. When governments misappropriate
the instruments of private governance, they can often achieve— whether
intentionally or not— global effects for public policy. While issues such as
data localization, data sovereignty, and extraterritoriality remain in the
public eye, it is worth considering how content regulation itself manifests
many of the same controversial aspects, like calling into question the consent of the governed.298
IV.

Principles for Moderation of Automation

By design, the new automated technologies of moderation not only
promote and advance the interests of law enforcement, but they also cultivate a sense of mutual dependency in which states require platforms’ assistance to vindicate policy objectives and platforms comply in order to avoid
harder regulation. Although this arrangement might seem “efficient,” in
the sense that both, states and platforms, receive optimal outcomes without costly interventions, they pose a threat to democratic values and safeguards. While artificial intelligence and other automated content
moderation tools hold substantial promise for scaling the work of content
moderation, they come at a significant cost to civil liberties and are poised
to entrench the power of the private sector.
This Part concludes by pointing toward several ways in which regulation might seek to exert a moderating influence upon the use of automation itself. By recalibrating the regulatory balance away from the current
emphasis on “scalability,” legislation and regulation might reach a healthier resolution that squares the challenges of harmful online content with
public governance and with individual rights.
A.

Platform Transparency

Several of the new measures require platforms to produce annual or
semi-annual transparency reports documenting the actions they have taken
to address unlawful content.299 But while transparency reports originated
as a way for technology companies to notify users about demands for surveillance and censorship, these new reporting obligations operate as a way
for governments to ensure that platforms are keeping up with the uptick in
Conference%20Proceedings.pdf [https://perma.cc/F8VJ-WFJ9] (“Has notice and takedown for copyright become de facto harmonized through platforms’ global application
of the DMCA?”).
298. Bloch-Wehba, supra note 21, at 67– 68 (describing questions about legitimacy
that arose from the emergence of governance institutions outside the state).
299. See, e.g., NETZWERKDURCHSET ZUNGSGESETZ [NetzDG] [Network Enforcement
¨ VERBRAUCHERSCHUTZ [BMJV] at
Act], Oct. 1, 2017, BUNDESMINISTERIUM DER JUSTIZ UND FUR
art. 1(2) (Ger.) (requiring social networks that receive over 100 complaints per year to
produce semi-annual transparency reports); Draft Terrorism Regulation, supra note 189,
at art. 8(2) (requiring service providers that have received removal orders to publish
annual transparency reports).
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censorship demands.300 In other words, transparency reports once served
companies’ public relations goals by establishing their independence from
the government. Now, in an era of concern about platform impunity, companies release data about content moderation in order to show compliance
with government demands.301
The existing transparency protections are woefully incomplete. The
transparency-reporting obligations under NetzDG and the draft terrorism
regulation require platforms to document their efforts to take down content that is the subject of a specific complaint, but do not fully capture
companies’ decisions to deploy automated mechanisms that avoid complaints arising in the first place. For this reason, platforms ought to be
more transparent about how, when, and why they deploy ex ante, automated screening of user-generated content. Precisely because laws like
NetzDG, the Australian AVM law, and Article 17 of the Copyright Directive
encourage— but do not require— automated content recognition, platforms
have choices about whether or not to do so. Understanding how automated measures fit within the framework of content moderation is necessary to have a fuller picture of the relationship between government
pressure and private sector practices.302
Perhaps more importantly, as Daphne Keller has pointed out, platform
transparency reports can only present a highly limited perspective on content moderation that reflects “the platforms’ own characterization of the
content they took down.”303 In its current form, aggregate data does not
explain, for example, the kinds of content that are swept up by an
algorithm designed to detect “terrorism,” nor the reasons that a platform
might not identify “white nationalism” as “terrorist content.”304
More robust transparency practices might shed some much-needed
light on these shifting dynamics. For example, platforms might routinely
300. See Jonathan Manes, Online Service Providers and Surveillance Law Transparency,
125 YALE L.J. F. 343, 344 (2016), https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/online-serviceproviders-and-surveillance-law-transparency [https://perma.cc/DE3D-38HL] (“If these
companies could win the right to speak about the kinds of records the government is
ordering them to disclose, they would be able to provide the public with crucial information about how the surveillance laws have been interpreted and applied in practice.”).
301. Mike Masnick, How Government Pressure Has Turned Transparency Reports from
Free Speech Celebrations to Censorship Celebrations, TECHDIRT (Apr. 17, 2018, 12:04 PM),
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20180402/07014939543/how-government-pres
sure-has-turned-transparency-reports-free-speech-celebrations-to-censorship-celebrations.shtml [https://perma.cc/85EX-V782].
302. To its credit, the draft terrorism regulation requires government agencies as well
as platforms to record removal orders. See Draft Terrorism Regulation, supra note 189, at
art. 8(a). Unfortunately, this requirement is skeletal, calling for governments to disclose
data regarding removal orders, investigations, and content “wrongly identified as terrorist.” Id. In addition, government authorities must disclose a “description of measures”
requested from service providers. Id.
303. See Three Constitutional Thickets, supra note 185, at 8.
304. Dı́az, supra note 129 (expressing the concern that GIFCT’s definition of “glorification” of terrorism is “imprecise”); Nitasha Tiku, Tech Platforms Treat White Nationalism
Different from Islamic Terrorism, WIRED (Mar. 20, 2019, 8:00 AM), https://www.wired.
com/story/why-tech-platforms-dont-treat-all-terrorism-same/ [https://perma.cc/SB88WL7W].
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review and audit their algorithms and datasets to determine whether automated methods experience different error rates with different speakers,
languages, or contexts, and then, publish the results.305 By the same
token, platforms might disclose other statistical information that would
show, for example, whether some types of speech garnered disproportionate complaints under NetzDG or other statutory mechanisms.
However, even robust audits and voluntary disclosures will lose credibility if they are self-enforced and self-policed. Therefore, in addition to
requirements that platforms publish aggregate data, regulators might consider requiring algorithmic transparency mechanisms.306 A growing body
of work has begun to critique the power of technology firms to “lock away
information in the face of a strong public interest in disclosure.”307 Without legislative intervention, platforms are likely to treat their methodologies of algorithmic enforcement as “trade secrets,” just as they have
vigorously sought to shield their policies on content moderation from public disclosure.308
A full review of the extensive literature on algorithmic transparency
and accountability is beyond the scope of this Article.309 For our purposes, it suffices to say that a regulator might opt to include provisions that
would make automated, ex ante content screening less inscrutable, either
by providing for government audits, facilitating independent research, or
by requiring disclosure.310
Transparency alone is not enough to ensure accountability, of
305. Indeed, major technology platforms are at the forefront of research on artificial
intelligence and machine learning, and, given the current distributions of resources,
these platforms are likely the institutions best equipped to undertake these kinds of
projects. See, e.g., AMAZON, https://www.aboutamazon.com/research [https://perma.cc/
CUA3-SKCB] (last visited Apr. 16, 2020); GOOGLE, https://ai.google/research/ [https://
perma.cc/9ZLE-ZU2W] (last visited Apr. 16, 2020); FACEBOOK, https://research.fb.com/
[https://perma.cc/9ELJ-ANFQ] (last visited Apr. 16, 2020); MICROSOFT, https://www.mi
crosoft.com/en-us/research/ [https://perma.cc/L2RK-YAJ9 ] (last visited Apr. 16, 2020).
306. See, e.g., Mike Ananny & Kate Crawford, Seeing Without Knowing: Limitations of
the Transparency Ideal and Its Application to Algorithmic Accountability, 20 NEW MEDIA &
SOC’Y 973, 974 (2016); Technological Due Process, supra note 11, at 1260; Transparency
and Algorithmic Governance, supra note 11, at 4.
307. Oren Bracha & Frank Pasquale, Federal Search Commission— Access, Fairness, and
Accountability in the Law of Search, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1149, 1202 (2008). See also
Hannah Bloch-Wehba, Access to Algorithms, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 1265, 1290 (2020); Dan
L. Burk & Julie E. Cohen, Fair Use Infrastructure for Rights Management Systems, 15
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 41, 59 (2001).
308. Burk & Cohen, supra note 307, at 67.
309. See, e.g., Burrell, supra note 261, at 10; Robert Brauneis & Ellen P. Goodman,
Algorithmic Transparency for the Smart City, 20 YALE J.L. & TECH. 103, 110 (2018); John
Danaher, The Threat of Algocracy: Reality, Resistance and Accommodation, 29 PHIL. &
TECH. 245, 258 (2016); Nicholas Diakopoulos, Accountability in Algorithmic Decision
Making, COMM. ACM, Feb. 2016, at 56, 60.
310. See, e.g., What Do We Mean When We Talk About Transparency?, supra note 270,
at 1529 (calling for more disclosure of disaggregated data with independent researchers). See also Rory Van Loo, Regulatory Monitors: Policing Firms in the Compliance Era,
119 COLUM. L. REV. 369, 424 (2019).
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course.311 That is why it is critical to pair transparency obligations with
other commitments to public oversight and to check the power of the private sector, including ongoing monitoring.312 But those who seek to censor and surveil also benefit from sub rosa arrangements that blur the line
between the private and public sectors. Shedding light on those arrangements is integral to holding these powerful institutions accountable.
B.

Procedural Safeguards

Platforms and their regulators might also consider embracing more
robust procedural safeguards that protect users who contest blocking and
filtering decisions. As Balkin recognized, digital filtering systems might
tend to operate as “prior restraints” on speech that prevent individuals
from speaking, rather than punishing them after-the-fact.313 Just as prior
restraints call for specific kinds of procedural protections to guard against
the risk of censorship, regulators might likewise integrate procedural safeguards— such as appeal mechanisms and judicial review requirements—
into platform regulation.314
Appeal mechanisms have gained substantial traction, especially as
Facebook began ramping up its Oversight Board to review its content moderation practices.315 These mechanisms need not be strictly private or voluntary. For example, the Copyright Directive requires each platform to
create an appeal mechanism for users to contest the removal of their content.316 Similarly, under the GDPR, individuals “have the right not to be
subject to a decision based solely on automated processing.”317
311. For critiques of this fallacy, see, e.g., Margaret B. Kwoka, FOIA, Inc., 65 DUKE L.J.
1361, 1365 (2016) (documenting how frequently the private sector uses transparency
law in its own self-interest); David E. Pozen, Freedom of Information Beyond the Freedom
of Information Act, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1097, 1146 (2017); Andrew Keane Woods, The
Transparency Tax, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1, 3 (2018). See also Woodrow Hartzog, Body Cameras and the Path to Redeem Privacy Law, 96 N.C. L. REV. 1257, 1275– 77 (2018) (describing, in the context of body cameras, the concern that public transparency might be coopted for private sector gain).
312. What Do We Mean When We Talk About Transparency?, supra note 269, at
1527– 28; Rory Van Loo, The Missing Regulatory State: Monitoring Businesses in an Age of
Surveillance, 72 VAND. L. REV. 1563, 1595 (2019) (suggesting that the ongoing monitoring of platforms’ speech practices might be justified).
313. Jack Balkin drew an analogy between digital filtering systems and prior
restraints. Relying on this comparison, certain safeguards might be appropriate in the
former context precisely because of their similarity to the latter. See Old-School/NewSchool Speech Regulation, supra note 12, at 2318.
314. Id. See also Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58– 59 (1965) (articulating
three safeguards).
315. Casey Newton, Facebook’s Oversight Board Could Bring a Justice System to a Platform That Needs One, VERGE (Sept. 18, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.theverge.com/interface/2019/9/18/20870605/faceboook-oversight-board-charter-justice-system [https://
perma.cc/B37U-V4WQ].
316. Copyright Directive 2019/790, supra note 165, at art. 17(9).
317. GDPR, supra note 284, at art. 22(1). See also Emily Pehrsson, The Meaning of the
GDPR Article 22 1, 22 (Stanford-Vienna Transatlantic Tech. Law Forum, Working Paper
No. 31, 2018) (discussing whether Article 22 is an outright prohibition of automated
decision-making or confers a “right to challenge” the outcome of an automatic decision).
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Apart from substantive oversight of content-related decisions, appeals
are also important because they play an integral role in promoting transparency and legitimacy. Through an appeals process, platforms might disclose information about the reasons that a piece of content is blocked or
taken down to the individual users who are affected. Thus, through
appeals, platforms (at least in theory) engage in a familiar kind of administrative reason-giving.318
Appeal mechanisms have several major drawbacks, however. First,
while they might make marginal improvements to transparency, they are
opaque and ineffective protections against over-deletion.319 Second, like
moderation itself, appeals present a problem of scale. Finally, requiring
platforms to create expensive and burdensome appeal mechanisms threatens small companies and start-ups while favoring dominant incumbents.
Large online platforms can and do construct entire quasi-legal regimes
for online speech, replete not only with statutes and regulations (terms of
service and community guidelines), but also with legal structures (complaints and appeals). Facebook’s Oversight Board (the Board) illustrates
how one large company has approached this issue by designing an independent body to oversee its content moderation decisions.320 In November 2018, Mark Zuckerberg announced that Facebook would create “a new
way to appeal content decisions to an independent body.”321 The company then opened a “public consultation process” for six weeks to get public feedback on the design of the Board.322 After holding a series of
invitation-only workshops and roundtables, the platform published its
draft Charter in September 2019.323 Under the Charter, the Board has the
authority to consider appeals of content-related decisions.324 The Board
can also set its own mechanisms for determining which “cases” to
318. Frank I. Michelman, Formal and Associational Aims in Procedural Due Process, 18
NOMOS 126, 126 (1977). As Michelman points out, even what he calls “nonformal”
explanations have significance for due process: they “seem responsive to demands for
revelation and participation. They attach value to the individual[] being told why the
agent is treating him unfavorably and to his having a part in the decision.” Id. at 127.
319. See, e.g., What Do We Mean When We Talk About Transparency?, supra note 269,
at 1537; URBAN ET AL., supra note 228, at 58; Censored, Suspended, Shadowbanned, supra
note 52, at 4378– 79.
320. Kate Klonick & Thomas Kadri, How to Make Facebook’s ‘Supreme Court’ Work,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/17/opinion/facebooksupreme-court-speech.html [https://perma.cc/MYW9-QRX4].
321. Mark Zuckerberg, A Blueprint for Content Governance and Enforcement,
FACEBOOK (Nov. 15, 2018), https://www.facebook.com/notes/mark-zuckerburg/a-blue
print-for-content-governance-and-enforcement/10156443129621634 [https://perma.cc/
773G-CYQN].
322. Brent Harris, Getting Input on an Oversight Board, FACEBOOK (Apr. 1, 2019),
https://about.fb.com/news/2019/04/input-on-an-oversight-board/ [https://perma.cc/
LXG2-DNRK].
323. Brent Harris, Establishing Structure and Governance for an Independent Oversight
Board, FACEBOOK (Sept. 17, 2019), https://about.fb.com/news/2019/09/oversightboard-structure/ [https://perma.cc/3GJL-T55E].
324. Oversight Board Charter, FACEBOOK 1, 4– 5 (2019), https://fbnewsroom
us.files.wordpress.com/2019/09/oversight_board_charter.pdf [https://perma.cc/JCD9Q8YG].
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consider.325
Despite the lengthy process for constructing the Board, the Charter is
strikingly short on detail regarding some essential aspects of its procedures. For example, the Charter is silent on whether parties before the
Board can be represented by counsel.326 The narrow scope of the Board’s
jurisdiction— only individual content decisions can be appealed— is also
questionable. For instance, the Charter does not include specific provisions regarding user appeals from decisions to disable their accounts, even
though that might also be considered a content-related decision.327 Since
Facebook does not offer appeals for all content-related decisions, there are
presumably also some areas over which the Board will lack authority, such
as child sexual abuse imagery.328
The Charter also anticipates that the Board’s decision in one appeal
might be binding on other content as well. First, the Board’s decisions are
“precedential.”329 Yet, the Charter also notes that, “where Facebook identifies that identical content with parallel context— which the Board has
already decided upon— remains on Facebook, it will take action by analyzing whether it is technically and operationally feasible to apply the Board’s
decision to that content as well.”330 Thus, while the Board will lack authority to decide cases arising from Facebook’s algorithmic delivery, curation,
or ranking of content, the Charter also anticipates that the company might
use its technical tools to instantiate Board decisions.331
The effectiveness of Facebook’s new appeals mechanisms largely
depends on factors that have yet to be publicly announced— namely, whom
it appoints to the Board.332 And Facebook’s commitment to public participation, input, and careful drafting in the process of formulating the Charter does not ensure that the Board’s approach to content governance will
add anything more than a symbolic veneer of compliance with free expres325. Id. at 5.
326. See generally id.
327. Sarah C. Haan, Bad Actors: Authenticity, Inauthenticity, Speech, and Capitalism,
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 47 (forthcoming) (“[C]ompanies sometimes justify this approach
on the ground that ‘authentic’ speakers produce ‘authentic content,’ which implies that
content produced by authentic speakers is truthful and good.”).
328. Understanding the Community Standards Enforcement Report, FACEBOOK, https://
transparency.facebook.com/community-standards-enforcement/guide [https://
perma.cc/D6NY-S4WV] (last visited June 22, 2020) (“[W]e offer appeals for the vast
majority of violation types on Facebook. We don’t offer appeals for violations with
extreme safety concerns . . . .”).
329. Oversight Board Charter, supra note 324, at 5.
330. Id. at 7.
331. Dipayan Ghosh, Facebook’s Oversight Board Is Not Enough, HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct.
16, 2019), https://hbr.org/2019/10/facebooks-oversight-board-is-not-enough [https://
perma.cc/X5PR-4H4R] (calling for “oversight of the company’s algorithmic decisionmaking to protect against bias”).
332. Jonathan Zittrain, A Jury of Random People Can Do Wonders for Facebook, ATLANTIC (Nov. 14, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/11/let-juriesreview-facebook-ads/601996/ [https://perma.cc/UP5R-2PVY] (“A bunch of retired
judges or other thoughtful people on that board can, perhaps, deliberate, show their
reasoning, and thus convince even those who don’t agree with them that the process
wasn’t rigged against them.”).
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sion values.333 Facebook’s effort to craft a participatory process— and its
invocation of the analogy to a “Supreme Court”334— does not change the
fact that this is a simulacrum of due process, unregulated by law or the
Constitution, and therefore, unaccountable to the democratic process. In
fact, Facebook’s grand experiment in constitutionalism just highlights that
platforms are free to design their quasi-legal protections without any legal
consequences or guarantees.
Partly in response to these concerns, platforms, non-governmental
organizations, and other stakeholders have considered a range of alternative options for private regulation to help rectify the imbalance, including
multi-stakeholder Social Media Councils, or SMCs.335 SMCs are similar to
Facebook’s Oversight Board in the sense that they are soft-law institutions,
and that their success relies upon voluntary adherence.336 But in other
respects, the similarity runs out. Rather than the Facebook Oversight
Board’s adjudicatory model, which focuses primarily on hearing individual
user appeals, SMC proposals have focused on a multi-stakeholder model
that would represent civil society organizations, platforms, users, and governments and advise them on content moderation issues far beyond
takedowns.337 Rather than being led by a single platform, SMCs can offer
guidance on cross-cutting issues affecting multiple platforms or the social
media sector more generally.338 SMCs might be global, national, or
regional in scope.339
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the SMC proposals is that,
unlike the Facebook Oversight Board, the fundamental business model of
the platform need not be off-limits to the SMC. One can imagine a world in
which the SMC’s adjudicatory and advisory functions go well beyond what
platforms define as “content moderation” and address other issues as well:
algorithmic ranking, advertising policy, and anonymity— to name just a
few. The potential breadth of the SMC concept, in turn, highlights how
narrow Facebook’s mandate for the Oversight Board truly is. Precisely
because SMCs are envisioned as multi-stakeholder institutions, they may
have greater potential to shed light on the entwined relationships between
333. CAROLYNN M. RYAN, INTERNAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION 2 (IRC Press 1998), available
at https://irc.queensu.ca/sites/default/files/articles/communicating-during-an-organizational-change.pdf [https://perma.cc/ECJ4-N7XJ] (observing that internal dispute resolution entails greater corporate control).
334. Klonick & Kadri, supra note 320.
335. Land, supra note 10, at 57– 59 (documenting different accountability
mechanisms).
336. Eileen Donahoe et al., Social Media Councils: From Concept to Reality, STAN. GDPI
1, 24 (2019), https://fsi-live.s3.us-west-1.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/gdpiart_
19_smc_conference_report_wip_2019-05-12_final_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/32QQ-J9Y6]
(describing how discussion of appointments to SMCs was partly a response to
Facebook’s announcement that it would appoint the first Oversight Board).
337. Id. at 26– 32 (presenting two potential models for SMCs). While the Article 19
model emphasizes an adjudicatory role for SMCs, the GDPi model emphasizes their
advisory function. Id.
338. Id.
339. Id.
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platforms and states. At the same time, however, SMCs would likely find it
difficult to maintain financial independence without significant state and
private-sector sponsorship, calling their neutrality into question.
These proposals warrant fuller consideration, especially regarding
their potential to realign— or reaffirm— the relationship between user
speech, private power, and government censorship. In particular, the
emergence of powerful corporate and multi-stakeholder institutions for
resolving speech issues might raise questions about the long-standing
assumption that government intervention is more dangerous to free speech
than private action.340 But, at least for now, the emergence of the
Facebook Oversight Board has dominated discussion of the potential for
soft-law institutions to intervene in content moderation debates.341 It
remains to be seen whether these new governance structures create more or
less powerful safeguards against wrongful deletion, censorship, and
surveillance.
1.

Court Orders

In addition to appeal mechanisms, as Molly Land noted, many proposals to improve accountability for content moderation have focused on the
need for formal legal processes— subject to judicial review— before a state
can request that a platform delete content.342 Without formal mechanisms
for ex ante judicial review and ex post remedies, government demands pose
the serious risk of coopting not only platforms’ substantive decisions, but
also their rules, regulations, and internal decision-making procedures.
So-called IRUs, the law enforcement squadrons that flag illicit content
online under private terms of service, highlight these risks. Most online
platforms require a court order or other formal request to justify complying with a law enforcement demand to remove user content.343 However,
IRUs operate as if they were ordinary users, flagging violations of the community standards just like any other individual.344 By employing a plat340. See, e.g., Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press— A New First Amendment Right, 80
HARV. L. REV. 1641, 1642 (1967) (“[O]nly by responding to the present reality of the
mass media’s repression of ideas can the constitutional guarantee of free speech best
serve its original purposes.”).
341. See generally, e.g., Evelyn Douek, Facebook’s Oversight Board: Move Fast with Stable Infrastructure and Humility, 21 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2019); Kate Klonick, The
Facebook Oversight Board: Creating an Independent Institution to Adjudicate Online Free
Expression, 129 YALE L.J. 2232 (2020); Catalina Botero-Marino et al., We Are a New Board
Overseeing Facebook. Here’s What We’ll Decide, N.Y. TIMES (May 6, 2020), https://
www.nytimes.com/2020/05/06/opinion/facebook-oversight-board.html [https://
perma.cc/TU8U-62PN]; Newton, supra note 315.
342. Land, supra note 10, at 57.
343. See, e.g., Google Transparency Report, GOOGLE, https://transparencyreport.google
.com/government-removals/overview?hl=en [https://perma.cc/HAE6-UHG2] (last visited July 7, 2020) (describing types of requests from government entities); but see
Facebook Transparency Report, FACEBOOK, https://transparency.facebook.com/contentrestrictions [https://perma.cc/6ENF-P4TA] (describing how government entities sometimes request the deletion or restriction of unlawful content without specifying which
method to use).
344. Land, supra note 10, at 23– 24.
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form’s community standards rather than the law itself, IRUs can achieve an
end-run around legal constraints meant to guard against censorship: they
can avoid judicial review and oversight. Obviously, this easier and more
straightforward strategy is enticing, but its costs to free expression are
significant.
In response, advocates and scholars have stressed the urgency of
requiring court orders and formal legal processes before state actors can
demand content takedowns.345 While this approach is an important constraint on discrete government demands that might relate to individual
users, posts, and pages, I am not confident that it addresses the broader
dynamics raised by automation in moderation. In particular, discrete
court orders are unlikely to address the greater tendency of platforms to
adopt technological solutions and symbolic structures of compliance to
avoid harder regulation. Additionally, maintaining a focus on discrete government demands risks overlooking the emerging pressures on platforms
to create new technologies and techniques of moderation. These new
forms of government pressure might not take the same shape as the old
demands to censor or surveil, but they will affect platforms’ design choices
and their implementation of private governance structures.
In other words, the risk that government actors might use informal or
coercive processes to restrict speech and privacy is not limited to content
takedowns or user-information demands but have increasingly extended to
the design and implementation of platform rules and compliance systems.
These kinds of coercive maneuvers are particularly powerful because they
are part of a constellation of simultaneous, increasing pressures on platforms.346 As a result, judicial orders for takedowns, while an important
constraint on the state’s ability to demand that platforms carry out its censorship and surveillance objectives, seem ill-equipped to address the risk
that platforms might overcompensate in order to seem eager to comply.347

345. Id. at 64. See also Chang, supra note 132, at 124– 25.
346. For example, anti-encryption measures have been enacted in the United Kingdom and Australia. See Lily Hay Newman, Australia’s Encryption-Busting Law Could
Impact Global Privacy, WIRED (Dec. 7, 2018, 12:45 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/
australia-encryption-law-global-impact/ [https://perma.cc/Z49X-LKZ2]. Moreover,
states are increasingly demanding that platforms store data locally. See, e.g., Ronak D.
Desai, India’s Data Localization Remains a Key Challenge for Foreign Companies, FORBES
(Apr. 30, 2019, 2:35 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ronakdesai/2019/04/30/
indias-data-localization-remains-a-key-challenge-for-foreign-companies/ [https://perma.
cc/EX7C-H96E]. And, of course, technology companies are facing more aggressive antitrust enforcement in Europe as well as in the United States. See Adam Satariano &
Matina Stevis-Gridneff, Big Tech’s Toughest Opponent Says She’s Just Getting Started, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/19/technology/tech-regulator-europe.html [https://perma.cc/UVW3-AQYC].
347. Daphne Keller (@daphnehk), TWITTER (Apr. 5, 2018, 10:44 AM), https://twitter.com/daphnehk/status/981905519920103424 (sardonically labeling platforms’
eagerness to demonstrate their policing capabilities as #VorauseilenderGehorsam, a German phrase meaning something along the lines of “preemptive obedience”).
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Conclusion
This Article has advanced three primary claims. First, the shift toward
automated, ex ante content moderation was prompted and made possible
by a legal architecture that insulated online intermediaries from liability
and was intended to secure their independence. This architecture left
space for intermediaries to develop new technologies and techniques that
themselves became the law of moderation. Second, today, those same technologies are sites of contestation, cooptation, and increasing government
control for user speech and privacy— reflecting the convergence of platform
and government interests in surveillance and control. Finally, for these
reasons, the modern regulations of online content that I have outlined are
best understood not as challenges to platform power, but rather as reflections of platforms’ own embeddedness in law enforcement, and vice versa.

